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I dedicate this work to my family.
Your absurdity and love keep me sane.
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Abstract
Three Essays in Environmental Economics
by
Ty Colin Robbins
My dissertation is comprised of three separate essays in the field of environmental eco-
nomics. The first chapter experimentally models the climate change social dilemma and
evaluates how heterogeneous environmental impacts and unequal endowments affect the
propensity to avoid catastrophic climate change. Introducing a punishment mechanism
to alleviate the collective bargaining problem, I identify the external factors and intrinsic
preferences that impede cooperation. Inequality and delayed contributions negatively
affect successful provision, while higher levels of collective-risk increase the probability
of threshold attainment. A consensual punishment mechanism incentivizes cooperation
in low-risk and heterogeneous groups, overcoming the collective action problem.
The second chapter investigates the efficacy of military and legal efforts to thwart
environmental domestic terrorism. While passive legislative interventions increase the
cost of illegal action and proactive policies thwart terrorism with preemptive strikes, the
efficacy of counterterrorism efforts has been questioned. Using quarterly data from 1980
to 2014, I analyze the effect of counterterrorism policy on radical environmental direct
action (REDA) modes of attack and the severity of illegal actions. Combining vector
autoregression and intervention analysis under a rational choice framework, I find that
while legislative policies have decreased the economic severity of attacks, incidents have
more than doubled. Proactive interventions reduce domestic terrorism, but by a smaller
magnitude than the increase from passive legislation. Substituting between modes of
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attack and ideological targets, policies have tripled the use of explosives while REDA
attacks against people have increased more than sixfold in the long run.
In the final chapter, I explore the role of payments for ecosystem services (PES) and
their impact on conservation efforts to avoid deforestation in developing nations. Tar-
geting counterfactual-based studies to identify additionality gains and minimize leakage
impacts, I perform a meta-analysis to evaluate how PES program design and market
factors impact avoided deforestation. Program design variables include contract length,
payment differentiation, and participation targeting. Environmental variables proxy for
opportunity costs by controlling for alternative land use prices and socioeconomic con-
ditions. As each dimension has a varying impact on avoided deforestation, these results
aim to influence future market-based interventions.
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Chapter 1
Punishment, Inequality, and
Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold
Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma
Abstract: International efforts to stave off adverse climate change have been lengthy
in deliberation and largely unsuccessful. While emission reductions are costly for the
mitigating individual but benefit the global population, additional factors (varying risk
susceptibility to climate change, heterogeneous mitigation efforts, and inequitable pol-
lution shares) have inhibited the ability to reach a binding environmental agreement. I
experimentally characterize the climate change social dilemma and evaluate how hetero-
geneous environmental impacts and unequal endowments affect the propensity to avoid
catastrophic climate change. Introducing a punishment mechanism to alleviate the col-
lective bargaining problem, I identify the external factors and intrinsic preferences that
impede cooperation. Inequality and delayed contributions negatively affect successful
1
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provision, while higher levels of collective-risk increase the probability of threshold at-
tainment. A consensual punishment mechanism incentivizes cooperation in low-risk and
heterogeneous groups, overcoming the collective action problem. Social preferences yield
guilt that increases contributions while risk aversion negatively impacts threshold attain-
ment in a game with strategic uncertainty.
1.1 Introduction
A future devoid of dangerous climate change constitutes a global public good with
costs incurred by emission-reducing nations and a universal benefit. Disagreements exist
as to distributional responsibility in tackling this global dilemma, resulting in an un-
der provision of the public good (Barrett, 2007). Though international meetings extend
discussion and boost cooperation, the question persists on whether heterogenous agents
can collectively reduce global emissions to avoid the ubiquitous risk of dangerous climate
change.
Framed as a “collective-risk social dilemma” (Milinski et al., 2008), a group of agents
must often cooperate to provide a public good where failure to do so may harm all in-
dividuals. Many examples can be found in public policy and even in cinematic plots,
from building levees for flood prevention to vaccinating all citizens to prevent the zombie
apocalypse. All it takes is a weak link in the chain of social cooperation to undermine
the vested efforts of the willing and leave the global population susceptible to risk. In
the context of climate change, this social dilemma is prominent in the effort to reduce
emissions to maintain a habitable climate. Rational agents may desire a future without
catastrophic changes, but the magnitude and timing of emission reductions continue to
be conditionally voluntary. Reasons for reneging on prior commitments include free rid-
2
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
ing off the investments of other nations, scientific uncertainty in climate thresholds, and
the inequity of developing countries reducing emissions while developed countries benefit
from significant historical emissions.
The theoretical and experimental literatures have identified the impact of group size
and repeated play in providing public goods, but the climate change dilemma poses a
richer environment. In this chapter I investigate the influence of varying risk susceptibil-
ity to climate change, heterogeneous mitigation efforts, and inequitable pollution shares
on contributions to a threshold public good. High risks of financial loss can incentivize
prosocial contributions, but when the risk is only as high as the necessary average invest-
ment (or lower), groups fail to reach a common target (Milinski et al., 2008). Assuming
homogeneous risk susceptibility to economic loss, however, negates the reality that na-
tions will experience heterogeneous impacts from dangerous climate change. Endowment
inequality creates an additional barrier to threshold attainment. Highly-endowed agents
often fail to signal cooperation early enough to achieve social efficiency (Tavoni et al.,
2011). My experiment models the interaction of heterogeneous risk and endowment in-
equality on group contributions in the climate game. In groups of four, participants
contribute to a climate fund over tens rounds to reach a target threshold. Assigned risk
factors denote the individual probability of losing net endowments if a group threshold is
not met. Each group has two “rich” and two “poor” players controlled by random pre-
determined play to induce endowment inequality. Without a salient threat of economic
loss, heterogeneity in risks and endowments across group members will deter cooperation
relative to the homogeneous baseline.
Complementing the external factors that influence behavior in social dilemmas, in-
trinsic preferences have only recently been modeled in public-choice research (Ostrom,
3
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1998; Teyssier, 2012). Agents endowed with different levels of risk and inequality have
varying attitudes about their economic standing relative to their peers. While risk and
inequity aversion have been incorporated in sequential games, I examine the impact of
social preferences on cooperative behavior in a multi-period public goods setting. Con-
tributions in the threshold public goods game minimize the probability of economic loss
and signal prosocial behavior, suggesting the existence of altruism. Individuals who en-
courage redistributive policies to reach the social optimum also benefit from their own
actions, either directly satisfying their desire for fairness or indirectly influencing co-
operation among the group. The reciprocation or deflection of social responsibility to
contribute toward the public good is thus contingent on both heterogeneous endowments
and preferences. A primary focus of this chapter is to isolate the external and internal
factors that simultaneously impact social cooperation in a collective-risk dilemma. A
follow-up questionnaire helps identify the motives of individuals who disproportionately
contribute to avoid dangerous climate change.
While a joint high probability of losing net earnings frequently induces collective ac-
tion, the added dimensions of heterogeneous risk, endowments, and intrinsic preferences
complicate public good provision. Communicating a non-binding intended contribution
increases the probability of threshold attainment (Tavoni et al., 2011), but cheap talk
with layers of heterogeneity may necessitate a credible threat. I introduce a consensual
punishment mechanism to incentivize cooperation. At the conclusion of the multi-period
threshold game, regardless of threshold attainment, players may choose to collectively
punish an individual group member. This instrument inhibits unilateral penalties and
emulates regional or global economic sanctions levied against free riders.
In this chapter I find that a consensual punishment mechanism is only effective when
4
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
perceived risk of economic loss is low among homogeneous or heterogeneous agents. Com-
plementing Milinski et al. (2008), coordination issues are overcome if perceived risk is
high enough in homogeneous treatments. Nations in reality develop their own climate
change susceptibility beliefs based on political agendas and scientific reports. With a
wide spectrum of risk beliefs among countries, I find that punishment may be the “great
equalizer” that eliminates total contribution differences between homogeneous and het-
erogenous groups. Rich players within successful groups significantly reduce, but do not
eliminate, the endowment inequality gap. Large early contributions enable rich players
to signal cooperation and increase the likelihood of threshold attainment by overcoming
trust issues commonly held by poor players. Punishment reduces a coordination problem
in heterogeneous groups by holding low-risk players accountable and incentivizing early
cooperation.
Incorporating social preferences alongside the previous external factors into a random-
effects model, while a player’s relative wealth fluctuates every round, both guilt and envy
influence individual contributions. Supported by the follow-up questionnaire, guilt is ten
times more influential than envy as players avoid material advantages even when faced
with heterogeneous risks. Risk aversion is a proxy for distrust in a game with strate-
gic uncertainty and negatively impacts poor player contributions. Aggregating intrinsic
preferences, group composition can further influence cooperation. Comparable to the
individual analysis, higher levels of collective guilt boost cooperation while increasing
levels of mean risk aversion continue to decrease levels of trust and negatively impact
contributions. Although intrinsic preferences influence individual contributions, high risk
in homogeneous treatments negates the impact of social preferences as a substantial risk
of economic loss is the ultimate free riding deterrent. In heterogeneous groups with a
complex coordination problem, envy plays a significant role in decreasing contributions
5
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while greater variation in aggregated risk aversion further stunts cooperation.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 1.2 presents a thorough
literature review on the varying components of the experiment and my contribution to
the literature. After reporting the results of traditional public goods games, I exhibit
how threshold mechanisms and collective risk have altered the direction of public goods
research. Section 1.3 introduces the experimental design, a procedure for eliciting and
quantifying aversion preferences, and the threshold public goods game that simulates
dangerous climate change. I also delineate the intricacies of a punishment mechanism
implemented in half of the treatments to incentivize cooperation. Section 1.4 presents
my hypotheses. External factors (inherited risk susceptibility & endowment inequality)
and intrinsic preferences (risk and inequality aversion) impact both individual and group
behavior. My hypotheses account for how these factors, in conjunction with punishment
possibilities, influence cooperation between the different treatments. Section 1.5 reports
trends among the estimation of aversion instruments. Experimental findings are pre-
sented in Section 1.6, both summary statistics in the threshold public goods game and
a random-effects regression analysis testing for the significance of external and internal
factors across treatments. Section 1.7 concludes.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Public Goods Games
In a traditional public goods game (PGG), homogenous agents have the option to
voluntarily contribute personal endowments to attain a public good. Public good costs
and benefits are typically linear in the contribution amount and there is no inherent risk
6
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when failing to supply the good, other than potentially losing prior investments and a
lack of the public amenity. The threshold PGG varies slightly, incorporating a contribu-
tion target that needs to be met or exceeded to supply the public good. Some models
incorporate refunds of private investment in the event that the threshold target is not
met (making it less risky to contribute), while others utilize a rebate system that re-
turns funds contributed over the necessary threshold (Ledyard, 1995). Within the global
game of climate change and emission reductions, no such refund or rebate system exists
that can dually compensate over/under efforts to curb green house gases (GHGs), so
this chapter will also preclude from such possibilities. In lieu of receiving a traditional
public good payoff for successful cooperation, when agents fail to achieve the targeted
number of avoided emissions (or contributions toward the public good), all agents face
a probabilistic risk of losing remaining endowments not invested in the group account.
In reality, contributing to the climate public good by reducing emissions may yield con-
tinuous benefits before and up to the threshold, including health gains and a reduced
risk of dangerous climate change. In an effort to maintain transparency and simplic-
ity for experimental participants, however, I focus on discrete benefits (i.e., avoiding the
risk of losing remaining private endowments) that only apply with threshold attainment.1
Theoretical and empirical research for the public goods problem have produced vary-
ing equilibria in games with and without a threshold. In a classic PGG without a target
threshold, the dominant strategy to maximize individual payoffs is to free ride off the con-
tributions of others, resulting in a socially inefficient outcome. In a survey of experimental
research, Ledyard (1995) finds that in repeated linear game settings with small groups,
1Asch et al. (1993) examined contribution levels for discrete public goods distributed with a provi-
sion point mechanism relative to a continuous public good that returned a constant fraction of group
contributions to all subjects for all contribution levels. Though free riding is a dominant strategy in the
continuous case and not in the provision of discrete public goods, the authors found that contribution
levels were not significantly different.
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results converge to the zero contribution equilibrium theoretically predicted. Though
the noncooperative equilibrium is rational, recent empirical evidence finds positive initial
contributions ranging from 40 to 60 percent of period endowments in a rich variety of
models. Utility maximization theory is unable to explain the existence of social pref-
erences, which include inequality aversion, selfishness, and other preferences that differ
from material interests (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Analyz-
ing strategic decisions and learning in repeated two-stage contribution games, Muller et
al. (2008) show that though contributions are initially positive and decrease over time,
experience generates smaller declines in contribution levels between stages in repeated
games.
Croson and Marks (2000) explore devices to correct the noncooperative equilibrium
by introducing a provision point (threshold) mechanism, intended to increase the costs
of free riding and induce cooperation. In traditional public goods games individual free
riding marginally impacts the level of public good provision. Using a provision point
mechanism, given that a threshold contribution target must be met, individual devia-
tions toward the free rider equilibrium could result in a total lack of public good provision.
Multiple theoretical equilibria exist in these games: a set of efficient equilibria where the
public good is provided when the threshold is exactly met and a set of inefficient equilibria
where provision fails to meet the threshold and the public good is not provided. Com-
plementing Isaac et al. (1989), Croson and Marks find that the inclusion of the threshold
mechanism significantly induces higher contributions to the public good. Successful pro-
vision, however, varies according to the size of the threshold relative to group wealth,
as relatively smaller targets are easier to attain and result in greater provision rates.
Bagnoli and McKee (1991) obtain a high rate of threshold attainment (nearly 90%), but
had low threshold targets relative to group wealth (about 23%). As the International
8
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
Panel on Climate Change (Metz et al., 2007) has called for a 50% reduction in current
GHG levels to reduce the risk of dangerous climate change, I adopt this provision point
as the target threshold in my experiment.
1.2.2 Collective Risk
Failure to reach a target threshold in the climate game results in a probabilistic
risk among all agents of losing remaining net endowments. Embedding this risk factor
differs from the traditional setting where failure to reach a threshold merely leads to
non-provision of the public good. Incorporating a homogeneous risk factor into their ex-
perimental setup of avoiding the public bad of dangerous climate change, Milinski et al.
(2008) conclude that a strategy to solve the collective-risk social dilemma is to convince
agents that failure to reach the target contribution threshold will result in significant
individual financial loss. Modeling 10 groups for each treatment of 10, 50, and 90 per-
cent risk probabilities of losing net endowments when a target threshold is not met, the
study found 5 of the 10 groups in the 90% treatment successfully collected the target
sum, while the other 5 groups marginally failed. Of the 50 and 10 percent treatments,
one and zero groups respectively achieved the target, suggesting the severity of potential
risks and economic ruin may induce cooperation. Santos and Pacheco (2011) also found
that decisions within small groups under high risk scenarios increase the coordination
rate. Large-scale cooperation, they conclude, is difficult to achieve and collective action
problems may be better solved with a combination of decentralized local agreements fo-
cusing on region-specific issues2. If coordination cannot be achieved with high risk factors
and small groups, experimental results maintain external validity in the context of the
world’s nations tackling dangerous climate change.
2International environmental agreements (IEA) are typically addressed in a single group setting
(Barrett (1997); Asheim et al. (2006))
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While incorporating risk is critical to model the provision of climate public goods,
nations are unequally susceptible to catastrophic impacts (Metz et al., 2007).3 Commonly
cited consequences of dangerous climate change include the West Antarctic ice sheet
collapse and a resulting sea level rise. All nations whose economies are connected through
international trade will feel an adverse effect from this event, but citizens in Kentucky
do not face equal risks of losing everything compared to those who live in small island
states, like Fiji. These latter nations are highly susceptible to extreme loss in the event
of catastrophic environmental change. Fisher et al. (1995) do not vary individual risk
factors, but instead vary valuation of a public good among subjects finding that group
contributions increase relative to the homogeneous valuation baseline. These results
may be driven by the common finding that contributions rise as valuations rise, not
proving that valuation heterogeneity exclusively overcomes collective action problems.
Fischbacher et al. (2012) find that heterogeneity in the return to public goods negatively
affects unconditional contributions. Instead of heterogeneous valuations in the traditional
public goods setting, games involving collective risk require modeling heterogeneous risk
probabilities on threshold attainment.4 Dividing group members according to high and
low risk susceptibility, this chapter models heterogeneity in the global climate game and
explores solutions to incentivize social cooperation.
1.2.3 Endowment Inequality in PGGs
Emission reduction agreements are hindered by economic inequality between devel-
oped and developing countries. Technology used to decrease emission production is costly
and developing nations find it difficult to finance such investments. Developed nations
3Unequal risks among affected regions depend on geographic location, ecological conditions, prior
preparation for extreme events, and past investments (Ostrom, 2010).
4Heterogeneous risk probabilities can also be interpreted as asymmetric adaptation capabilities.
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introduced a Green Climate Fund to redistribute aid to poor countries for green invest-
ment but significant delays inhibit the program. Distributional responsibility for cutting
emissions and sharing costs continues to be a key tipping point in the development of an
international climate change treaty.
Relaxing assumptions from earlier work by Warr (1983) that found group contribu-
tions to a public good should be invariant after income redistribution, Bergstrom et al.
(1986) show that income redistribution away from noncooperators may actually increase
group contributions to the public good. An experiment by Chan et al. (1996) reveals that
while mean group contributions do increase with redistribution, individual contributions
significantly vary between rich and poor players. Inconsistencies between the theoretical
model and experiment are possibly driven by notions of fairness. Incorporating social
preferences, behavioral models predict that higher income individuals contribute a larger
share of their endowments than do low income individuals, though empirical support for
this claim is mixed (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002). Anderson et
al. (2008) find that common knowledge of each individual’s relative endowment reduces
contributions for all participants in public goods games. Reuben and Riedl (2011) also
find that free riding is frequent and steadily increases over time comparably in hetero-
geneous and homogeneously endowed groups. Integrating variation in both income and
preferences, Chan et al. (1999) conclude that inequality in one dimension has a strong
positive impact on public good provision while heterogeneity in both dimensions simul-
taneously yields a smaller but still significant effect. Conflicting evidence of contribution
levels in the presence of inequality necessitates further empirical investigation.
Modeling endowment inequality in the climate game with homogeneous risk among
group members, Tavoni et al. (2011) augmented Milinski et al. (2008) to evaluate how
11
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equity concerns between rich and poor individuals affect group contributions in the at-
tainment of a climate threshold. As the 2009 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference
introduced a pledge system for emission reductions, Tavoni et al. induced coordination
by including an option to communicate non-binding intended contributions. They found
that early signaling by rich agents increased the probability of meeting the target thresh-
old. While communication may alleviate collective action problems, cheap talk might
ensue, requiring a stronger mechanism to provide credible threats. Ostrom (2010) notes
that persistent communication and updated monitoring, without relying on preexisting
levels of trust, are important devices needed to solve the collective action problem. This
chapter’s experiment takes a similar approach to Chan et al. (1999) by incorporating two
types of inequality, endowment and risk heterogeneity, to model the climate game.
1.2.4 Risk Aversion versus Inequality Aversion
Climate change modeling has sparked debate regarding a simplifying assumption that
exploits a single parameter (the elasticity of marginal utility of consumption) to capture
(i) risk aversion, (ii) intertemporal substitution preferences, and (iii) spatial inequality
aversion (Dasgupta, 2007; Dietz et al., 2007; Nordhaus, 2007). My experiment distin-
guishes risk and inequality aversion to model behavior in cooperative games. Traditional
efforts to measure risk aversion present experimental subjects with a set of pairwise
choices between lottery distributions containing the same mean but different variances,
associating preferences based on the individual’s decisions. Kroll and Davidovitz (2003)
argue that when the less unequal state is preferred, the subject could be considered
inequality and risk averse, rather than exclusively one or the other. Carlsson et al.
(2005) investigate the determinants of individual risk (holding inequality constant) and
inequality aversion (holding risk constant). They find that inequality averse subjects
12
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are also more risk averse (and vice versa), and that both factors vary significantly with
sex, field/major, and political preference. Building off of Kroll and Davidovitz (2003),
Magdalou et al. (2009) do not find a significant correlation between the two aversion
parameters. Teyssier (2012) finds that risk aversion in a sequential public goods game
is negatively correlated with contribution levels of leading movers, while advantageous
inequity averse second movers tend to free ride less and cooperate more than others.
While contributions may be simultaneously influenced by risk and inequality aversion
profiles, a collective-risk threshold PGG introduces a separate psychological risk factor
of non-attainment. This chapter elicits risk and inequality aversion, distinguishing the
influence of intrinsic preferences on social cooperation.
1.2.5 Punishment Mechanism
Experimental studies have found that costly options to punish free riders greatly
incentivize sustained contributions toward public good provision (Ostrom et al., 1992;
Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000). Agents who contradict socially acceptable behavior are retal-
iated against even if tangible benefits from costly punishment is negligible. While the
existence of peer-to-peer sanctions can induce near efficient cooperation, varying the ef-
fectiveness of punishment (the factor by which punishment reduces a punished player’s
income) below relative income thresholds may not be able to prevent the cooperation
failure (Nikiforakis and Normann, 2008). Complicating matters is the disparate use of
linear versus non-linear punishment that can incorporate variable fine-to-fee sanction
schedules (Casari, 2005). The fine-to-fee ratio reflects the punished player’s reduced in-
come relative to the punisher’s fee to punish. When punishment reduces the punished
player’s income by a certain percentage in non-linear studies, punishment effectiveness
becomes convex in the target’s income, making comparisons between treatments difficult.
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Higher levels of punishment effectiveness have also been found to increase the propen-
sity to punish (Anderson and Putterman, 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Subjects in these
studies who wish to impose punishment on a pair of individuals may opt to only pun-
ish the player whose fine-to-fee ratio is greatest, all else equal, maximizing sanctions
given costly punishment. Examining this player’s decision strategy would fail to reveal
the demand for punishing both agents, permitting only partial preference identification.
Studies have also identified a propensity for contributors to punish defectors even when
the fine-to-fee ratio is one (Falk et al., 2005; Sefton et al., 2005; Nikiforakis and Nor-
mann, 2008). In this scenario punishment does not reduce income differences between
individuals and may instead indicate the desire to sanction particular actions. Casari
(2005) exhibited that the fine-to-fee punishment ratio must be constant for all agents
to credibly identify the factors that induce punishment decisions. Successful collective
action also depends partly on the types of individuals that comprise the group, shown
in Ones and Putterman (2007), where homogeneous and heterogeneous group formation
by punishment proclivity helped predict the differences in contributions to a public good.
Bochet et al. (2006) paired punishment with communication, concluding that the
paired mechanisms do not significantly increase homogeneous group contribution levels
relative to communication alone. They also detected the existence of perverse punish-
ment, that is, punishment being directed at individuals whose contributions were higher
than average. Punishment modeled with endowment heterogeneity generally induces sta-
ble cooperation in both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups (Visser and Burns, 2006;
Reuben and Riedl, 2011). Prediger (2011) finds that heterogeneous groups punish less
often and at smaller magnitudes, yielding higher group contributions. Casari and Luini
(2009) used a consensual rule mechanism to influence cooperation where punishment
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was only carried out if a coalition of two or more agents chose to sanction an individual.
Consensual punishment induced higher cooperation and lower rates of punishment than
autonomous punishment. The authors contend that the lower threat of punishment under
the consensual treatment provides stronger incentives for cooperation as this mechanism
censors out perverse punishment, effectively blocking more than 70 percent of attempts
to punish strong cooperators while only 10 percent of requests to punish free riders was
blocked. Ga¨chter and Herrmann (2006) find that autonomous punishment without con-
straint may cripple cooperation and circumvent the gains from punishment that intend
to credibly threaten free riders. Improved institutions beyond autonomous peer-to-peer
punishment seem to exist and warrant closer examination.
In the realm of threshold PGGs, particularly with collective risk, there appears to
be a dearth of research that incorporates a punishment mechanism to generate collective
action. This chapter contributes to the literature by enriching the experimental environ-
ment and identifying the elicited individual preferences and external factors that dually
inhibit and induce cooperation.
1.3 Experimental Design
All sessions of the study were carried out in the Experimental and Behavioral Eco-
nomics Laboratory at UC Santa Barbara with 216 subjects recruited from an ORSEE
research pool, programmed and conducted with the experiment software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). At this undergraduate level, subjects have little training in expected
utility and public goods games. Fifteen experimental sessions were run, involving be-
tween 8 and 16 participants per session (depending on show-ups) who earned an average
of $12.20 for about 50 minutes of their time.
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In each treatment subjects first played three independent games (described below)
followed by a threshold public goods game for 10 rounds. In this last game participants
were randomly assigned into four-person groups that were held constant for the duration
of play.5 Instructions appeared on a subject’s computer monitor before each independent
game, followed by a short set of control questions to check understanding. Any questions
of misunderstanding were answered privately. The experimental design avoided giving
subjects feedback related to their own and group earnings in the sub-games before the
threshold PGG, restricting any incentive to alter behavior in future games based on prior
performance. Subjects had common information of the repeated play format with con-
stant group members in the threshold PGG. At the conclusion of this fourth game, a
questionnaire was given to elicit beliefs and socioeconomic data. Experimental Tokens
(ETs) were used in all games, with a conversion rate boldly stated in each game’s instruc-
tions. Show up fees were $5 with the chance to increase payoffs depending on individual
and group play in the subsequent games. To incentivize maximum effort, subjects were
informed at the beginning of the session that final payoffs would be contingent upon the
outcome from one randomly selected game of the games played.6 Final individual payoffs
were distributed privately at the end of the session.
1.3.1 Risk Elicitation
In the three independent games played before the threshold PGG, I quantitatively
measure risk and inequality aversion.7 Assuming that a subject’s preferences can be ap-
5Constant groups in the threshold PGG allows for reputation effects. International environmental
agreements typically hold constant the group of nations making collective decisions as there is rarely a
change in the number of countries taking part in negotiations.
6Participants were advised that one of their peers would roll a die at the conclusion of the experiment
to determine the game used for final payoffs.
7Complete experimental instructions are included in the Appendix.
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proximated by a particular expected utility model, risk aversion is traditionally measured
with a lottery game (Holt and Laury, 2002). Regression analysis and qualitative interpre-
tation are improved with point-estimates of aversion parameters whereas Holt’s method
only supplies an interval estimate of risk aversion. To avoid the analytical problems
of interval estimates, I instead employ the method developed in Charness and Genicot
(2009) to measure risk aversion. Individuals are endowed with 100 tokens and can invest
any portion of this amount in a risky asset that yields a payoff of 2.5 times the amount
invested if successful (50% probability)8, always retaining net endowments not invested.
The more an individual invests in a risky asset the less risk-averse she is relative to her
peers. Assuming constant relative risk aversion and eliciting the investment decision, I
then calculate each individual’s point-estimate risk aversion parameter.9 Robustly mea-
suring risk aversion, Holt’s method was utilized during the followup questionnaire to
compare against the point-estimates elicited. Subjects sequentially chose between a set
of pairwise lotteries, where a given lottery differs from its counterpart in the spread of
potential payments and the lottery mean (Beckman et al., 2004).10
1.3.2 Inequality Aversion
I adopt the approach from Blanco et al. (2011) and Dannenberg et al. (2007) to mea-
sure inequality aversion, using the strategy method to record preferences in a modified
dictator game (MDG) and an ultimatum game (UG) described below. Utilizing both
games allows for the identification of advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aver-
8As noted in Charness and Genicot (2009), a 50% success probability “avoids the problem of subjective
over-weighting of low-probability events.”
9A drawback of this method is that no concrete point-estimate can be derived if the participant chooses
to invest 0 or 100. In such cases of relative “extreme” risk aversion or risk-loving, respectively, point-
estimates were coded appropriately. Qualitative results proved robust to these coded characterizations
of risk aversion.
10To avoid hypothetical risks and payoffs, I informed participants that three people would be randomly
paid based on the result of this lottery. These payments would supplement their payoffs from the rest of
the experiment. This procedure is similar to the payment method used in Charness and Genicot (2009).
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sion. Differentiating the magnitude of relative inequality and risk aversion will be useful
in order to identify the main drivers that both inhibit and support collaborative efforts
in the supply of public goods (or avoidance of public bads). Three independent games
(Risk, MDG, UG) are presented to subjects prior to introducing the more complicated
threshold PGG.11 In this fashion there is a natural progression of complexity in the sub-
games which may help filter out errors in understanding and decision making. I employ
the model developed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to parameterize aversion preferences in
the two-player UG and MDG games. An advantage of this model is that aversion prefer-
ences elicited can be applied to the threshold PGG, assuming that aversion preferences
in one game are a simple monotonic transformation of the thresholds in a separate game
(Teyssier, 2012). Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function is given by:
Ui(xi, xj) = xi − αi max[xj − xi, 0]− βi max[xi − xj, 0] for i 6= j, (1.1)
where α measures disadvantageous inequality aversion and β measures advantageous in-
equality aversion. Assumptions in this model include αi ≥ βi and 0 ≤ βi < 1. The
first of these conditions imparts the assumption that an individual suffers more disutility
from being at a material disadvantage than at an advantage relative to her counterpart.
The latter condition rules out the existence of individuals who take pleasure in being
better off than others (βi < 0), while βi < 1 departs from the implausible event that an
individual would give up a dollar or more to reduce their advantage relative to player j.12
11Controlling for possible order effects, I varied the sequence that these games were introduced. Im-
practical to include all six permutations of possible three-game configurations, I ran three of the pos-
sibilities (Risk-MDG-UG, MDG-UG-Risk, UG-Risk-MDG). Finding no detectable differences between
these three sequences, all treatments were pooled for data analysis.
12Section 1.5 reports estimates for aversion parameters and tests the relevancy of Fehr and Schmidt’s
assumptions. Empirical evidence in the literature suggests a positive correlation between advantageous
and disadvantageous inequity aversion, which will also be explored with the data set.
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Deriving disadvantageous inequality aversion, α, participants are introduced to a two-
stage ultimatum game whose focal point is the division of a pie worth 20 tokens between
two individuals, a proposer and a responder. In the first stage the proposer offers an
integer share of the pie, s, of which the responder accepts or rejects in the second stage.
The outcome of this offer is 20 − s for the proposer and s for the responder, if the pro-
posal is accepted, and zero for each participant otherwise. Unaware of their possible
role assignment later in the experiment, all participants made choices in each of the two
roles: (i) proposers chose an integer share s ∈ {0, 20} to offer the responder and (ii) re-
sponders chose to accept or reject each of the twenty-one possible “Proposer-Responder”
distributions of tokens (20-0, 19-1, . . . , 0-20).13 If this game is chosen for final payoffs
at the end of the experiment, participants are randomly paired and randomly assigned
one of the two roles, at which point the actual proposed offer and responder’s decision to
this offer are compared to determine payoffs. Applying the strategy method to capture
the responder’s contingent decision set, the minimum accepted offer yields information
to calculate near point-estimates of α. Following Blanco et al. (2011), suppose that
s
′
i is the lowest offer that individual i hypothetically chooses to accept, thus (s
′
i − 1)
represents the highest offer they would reject. Assuming well-behaved preferences such
that there exists a single point where the individual switches from rejecting a set of
offers to accepting the rest, a responder will be indifferent between accepting an offer
si ∈ [s ′i − 1, s ′i ] and receiving zero payoff from a rejection. Further assuming the pro-
poser offers no more than half the pie, Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function (1.1) yields:
Ui(si, 20 − si) = si − αi(20 − si − si) = 0 = Ui(0, 0).14 Solving for αi, the estimate for
13See Game 3 in the Appendix for a screen shot.
14Of the 216 participants, only 8 offered more than half of the pie. The estimation of α is not affected
by these offers but instead impacts the point at which a switch from rejection to acceptance occurs.
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disadvantageous inequality aversion is
αi =
si
20− 2si . (1.2)
For the purposes of estimation, I set si = s
′
i − γ, where γ = 0.5.15 Individuals who re-
peatedly rejected low proposed offers were characterized as increasingly disadvantageous
inequality adverse and consequently had higher values of α. Exploring the implications
of equation (1.2), the offer must be s ∈ [0, 10] as I assume the proposer offers no more
than half of the pie. Since rational responders accept an equal share offer then s
′
i ≤ 10
and division by zero does not occur. Extreme values of αi materialize if the responder
never switches from their initial decision in the first set of pairwise choices. Individuals
who reject every feasible offer less than half of the pie accept only if si ≥ 10, allowing
us to infer at most that αi ≥ 4.5. I cautiously assign these individuals αi = 4.5 with
no further information to make a better estimation of their preferences. On the other
side of the spectrum, I never observe a switching point for individuals who accept every
offer (s
′
i = 0) and assign them αi = 0. This characterization assumes the nonexistence
of subjects who derive utility from being at a disadvantage relative to others.
Eliciting advantageous inequality aversion, β, the modified dictator game posits an
initial endowment of 20 tokens for the dictator who decides how much of this total she is
at most willing to sacrifice for an equitable distribution of payoffs between herself and the
recipient. In this setting, participants make choices in the lone role of the dictator. A list
of twenty-one pairwise payoff decisions are listed and the participant chose their preferred
15To estimate αi, the choice of a parameter adjustment factor (γ) equal to 0.5 is indeed arbitrary
to identify an offer, si, that is between the individual’s maximum offer rejected and minimum offer
accepted. If I assume that γ is normally distributed between the continuum of values in [0,1], then I
can justify the choice for γ. A sensitivity analysis inserting γ = 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9 for robustness yielded
no substantial qualitative differences in the regression analysis.
20
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
payoff distribution in each case. The left choice is always a distribution of (20,0) for the
Dictator-Recipient payoff and the right choice contained equal payoffs ranging from (0,0)
to (20,20).16 If this game is chosen for final payoffs at the end of the experiment then:
(i) participants are randomly paired and randomly assigned one of the two roles, (ii) one
of the twenty-one pairwise payoff vectors is randomly chosen, and (iii) the decision of the
dictator determines payoffs. Again employing the strategy method to measure aversion
preferences, I identify the point at which the dictator switches from the (20,0) unequal
distribution to the equitable payoff distribution. Per Blanco et al. (2011), if an individual
switches from the unequal payoff vector of (20,0) to the egalitarian outcome at (x
′
i , x
′
i ),
then I can infer that they prefer the payoff (20,0) over (x
′
i − 1, x ′i − 1).17 Together these
two reference points relate the individual’s threshold for sacrificing a (20,0) outcome in
favor of an equitable one. Since payoffs are based on integer values, there must exist
an egalitarian payoff vector, (xi, xi), that renders the individual indifferent between this
outcome and (20,0). Using Fehr and Schmidt’s utility function (1.1) again, it must be
that Ui(xi, xi) = xi = 20− 20βi = Ui(20, 0) for some xi ∈ [x ′i − 1, x ′i ] and x ′i ∈ {1, 20}.
Solving for βi, the estimate for advantageous inequality aversion is
βi = 1− xi
20
. (1.3)
Similar to the justification for α, I set xi = x
′
i − γ, where γ = 0.5. In accordance with
Fehr and Schmidt I assume β ∈ [0, 1], however, the two endpoints warrant discussion.
16See Game 2 in the Appendix for a screen shot.
17Similar to the UG game, this characterization assumes individuals have well-behaved preferences such
that they have a unique switching point from the payoff (20,0) to the egalitarian payoff. Experimentally
I found that a number of participants routinely switched between these payoffs more than once. These
participants may not have well-behaved preferences, possibly suffered from fatigue, or did not completely
understand the logic of the game. For these participants, I calculated three values for their switching
point (a minimum, average, and maximum) based on their decisions. The estimation of these individuals’
aversion parameters is imperfect and I take care to explore possible implications later in the chapter
by analyzing subject behavior with (i) the full pool of participants and (ii) restricting analysis to those
individuals with well-behaved preferences.
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Individuals who choose the equitable option for each of the 21 decisions (i.e. forgo a
payoff of (20,0) for all choices) have a strict aversion to advantageous inequality and
Ui(0, 0) > Ui(20, 0), which implies that βi > 1. No switching point is ever observed for
these participants and it is possible that they are willing to sacrifice in excess of $1 to
reduce inequality by $1. As in Blanco et al. (2011), I cautiously assign these participants
βi = 1. Other subjects for whom a switching point is unobserved include those that
never deviate from the (20,0) choice. At the extreme this suggests Ui(20, 0) > Ui(20, 20)
and βi < 0, thus they may be willing to sacrifice funds to increase inequality. These
individuals are assigned βi = 0 since I do not observe a switching point and cannot
further divulge their unique preferences.
1.3.3 Threshold Public Goods Game
The threshold public goods game (TPGG) modifies the experimental setup developed
by Milinski et al. (2008) and amended by Tavoni et al. (2011), randomly dividing partici-
pants into groups of four (constant for the game) whose aim is threshold attainment after
10 rounds of play. Conducted in an environment of complete information, subjects within
each group were attributed a commonly known unique endowment and risk factor bundle
that defined their initial standing in the TPGG. Though a player’s endowment and risk
profile were known to all group members, players did not know each other’s identities
and instead were assigned a Player ID Number (P1-P4) maintained for the duration of
the game. Player ID Numbers and associated endowment/risk profiles were displayed
constantly on the computer terminal throughout the game. Constant IDs allowed group
members to identify each other exclusively by endowment, risk, and contribution profile,
enabling the formation of reputations. Each player was endowed with 40 experimental
tokens (ETs) at the start of the game.
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Modeling endowment inequality within all treatments, I adopt the approach of Tavoni
et al. (2011) and subject all group members to three inactive contribution rounds that
force half of the subjects (2) to contribute 4 ETs per round to the collective fund while
the other half (2) are forced to contribute nothing. “Rich” players are characterized by
starting round 4 with 40 ETs in their individual account whereas “poor” players begin
with 28 ETs. The target contribution threshold was set at 80 ETs and for the sake of
comparability all treatments started the active phase (rounds 4-10) with 24 ETs in the
collective fund. A threshold of 80 ETs constitutes 50 percent of the aggregate group
endowment of 160 ETs, reflecting the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s sug-
gestion of achieving a 50% reduction in emissions relative to prior levels.18 There are no
framing effects in this experiment as I distinctly avoid using any verbiage related to the
climate or climate change. Previous studies relate the group fund as a “climate account,”
potentially biasing individual behavior.
In four of the six treatments, homogeneous risk factors were distributed to all group
members that imposed a collective 1
3
or 2
3
risk of losing private net endowments when
failing to reach the target threshold by the game’s conclusion. All other treatments were
assigned heterogeneous risk factors amongst group members, whereby two players inher-
ited a 1
3
(and the other two a 2
3
) risk susceptibility of losing private net endowments when
the threshold was not met. Varying risk factors characterize the different levels of dan-
gerous climate change that individuals and nations may be vulnerable to, depending on
geographical location, adaptive capacity, etc. Homogeneous risk groups maintain a single
dimension of inequality in endowments, whereas heterogeneous risk groups have an equal
18Contributions to the climate fund and reductions in emissions are synonymous in this experiment.
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Table 1.1: Threshold PGG Treatment Breakdown
Treatments
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
Endowment Inequality* X X X X X X
Punishment X X X
Homogeneous low (1
3
) risk X X
Homogeneous high (2
3
) risk X X
Heterogeneous risk** X X
*Two players from each group are “poorly” endowed; two players are “richly” endowed.
**Two players from each group have high-risk factors ( 23 ); two players have low-risk factors (
1
3 )
See Section 1.3.3 for more details.
distribution of rich/poor and low/high risk types.19 In each active period of the TPGG
(rounds 4-10), subjects were simultaneously asked for a 0, 2, or 4 ET investment from
their private account to the group fund.2021 At the conclusion of each round, individual
contribution levels to the group account were revealed by Player ID with risk/endowment
type, as were total past contributions by individual, aggregate group contributions in the
current round, and aggregate group contributions for all rounds up to the present.22
End game payoffs were calculated according to whether the collective 80 ET threshold
19The chosen distribution of risk/endowment types being equal within heterogenous groups (one indi-
vidual of each risk/endowment profile per group) may have an impact on the results of the TPGG. This
experiment attempts to model inherent heterogeneity in the extreme case of one profile type per group,
but it could be argued that experimental results may be conditional on group type distributions. A
simple uniform distribution of types within each group was chosen to model the heterogeneity in wealth
and risk susceptibility, exhibited by the multitude of member types present during international climate
agreements.
20Isaac et al. (1989) and Croson and Marks (2000) suggest avoiding the word “contribution” (framing
effect) and instead phrase as “allotments” or “allocations” to the public fund.
21This subset of possible contributions from total endowments reflects the gradual process in cutting
back emissions as opposed to a discontinuous bevy of emission reductions in a single round which is
difficult to accomplish with known technology constraints. Further, integer contributions are imposed
to help identify altruists, fair sharers, and free riders (Milinski et al., 2008).
22Tavoni et al. (2011) abstract away from revealing the aggregate group contribution for all rounds
up to the present and instead allow players to calculate the total amount on their own. In a game
with strategic uncertainty and complicated behavioral interactions, I remove the possibility of individual
calculation errors to ensure that decision strategies are based on complete and accurate information,
rather than potential mistakes in arithmetic.
24
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
was met or exceeded after 10 rounds, including punishment results if relevant. In the
no-punishment treatment when the threshold was met after 10 rounds of contributions, a
subject retained any private endowments not invested in the public good. If the threshold
was not met, remaining private endowments were at risk of being lost with respect to
the relative risk factor assigned in their treatment.
Incorporating a mechanism to induce cooperation, most experiments introduce an
autonomous form of punishment. Within this experiment, autonomous punishment might
be integrated where participants at the conclusion of the 10 round game simultaneously
have a decision whether to buy punishment points to decrease the payoffs of fellow group
members who deviate from their personal norm of expected contributions.23 Following
recent studies (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Casari and Luini, 2009), at a private cost of one
ET per punishment point purchased, an individual can decrease the earnings of another
group member by a constant three ETs24. If an individual received multiple punishment
points across group members, their reduction in earnings would reflect the cumulative
amount of punishment points received. In the event that the target threshold is at a
minimum achieved, each player’s individual payoff would be:25
23Contrary to other punishment studies that allow sanctions after each round, I implement end-game
punishment. In the complex climate change game, retributive actions will typically be taken in the event
that a collective threshold is not met. It would not be practical to punish noncooperators after each
round since in the real world the level of emission reductions undertaken is an imperfect measure that
only can be quantified after a certain number of lagged periods, justifying end-of-game punishment.
24See discussion in Section 1.2 for the impact of different fine-to-fee effective punishment ratios.
25This setup assumes that potential punishment will happen before each individual’s risk die is rolled,
in the event that the target threshold is not met. This is the preferred approach (as opposed to impos-
ing punishment after an individual’s risk die is rolled), given the possibility that an agent wishing to
punish another may find themselves unable to do so if the targeted agent has lost the game of chance
(unfavorable risk outcome) and all remaining private endowments. In this scenario, because the punisher
cannot punish the targeted individual, the outcome of the game would not capture one’s desire and the
magnitude by which they punish another, excluding this important behavioral choice from the results.
Additionally, if one agent wanted to punish another agent and can only do so after a die has been rolled
(with a favorable result for the risk taker), punishment levels may be more vindictive than the initial
desired punishment allocation for game behavior, given that the proposed punishable agent not only
escaped positive contributions during the TPGG but also avoided their inherent risk of losing remaining
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piAi = max{ei −
10∑
t=4
cit −
∑
j 6=i
pji −
∑
j 6=i
pij, 0} (1.4)
where:
ei ≡ net endowment after 3rd inactive round for person i for
i = 1, . . . , 4
cit ≡ contribution by person i in round t
pji ≡ amount of punishment points i buys to hurt j pji ∈ 0, 1, . . . , 7.26
If the threshold target is not met, then subject payoffs (remaining private endowment
net punishment) are in jeopardy of being depleted according to the risk factors assigned
in the treatment.
Instead of autonomous punishment, I introduce a consensual punishment mechanism
(Casari and Luini, 2009), where simultaneous punishment requests are only carried out
when two or more members from a group assign punishment points to a particular in-
dividual.27 There only needs to be an agreement in the decision to punish, not the
magnitude of punishment. When the reductions are carried out and the threshold has
private funds. One can easily imagine that the punisher may be left fuming at the result of the game
and the punishee’s favorable die roll, willing to make even more costly punishment decisions that is not
exclusively based on participation in the TPGG.
26I cap punishment possibilities to detract away from highly endowed individuals having the capacity
to punish more than poorly endowed individuals (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Reuben and Riedl, 2011).
27A consensual punishment mechanism parallels governing bodies responsible for imposing sanctions.
When punishments are enforced after agreed upon by a majority of members, these sanctions would be
carried out by those who vote for them and thus incur the cost of sanctioning themselves. Outside of
the environmental arena, examples abound where economic sanctions are imposed upon nations that
deviate from the realm of acceptable behavior. A group of nations would vote on whether to impose
sanctions and if successful the member nations voting in favor would be responsible for the sanctions
imposed. Of course, unilateral sanctions are possible (along the lines of autonomous punishment), but I
abstract away from this possibility in the experiment and focus on developing a mechanism that could
be implemented along the global scale. (See Section 1.2.5 for more information.
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been met, payoffs are:
pici = max{ei −
10∑
t=4
cit −
∑
j 6=i
K(j)pji − 3K(i)
∑
j 6=i
pij, 0} (1.5)
where:
K(i) =

1 if (
∑
j
Ii,j) ≥ 2
0 otherwise
and Ii,j = 1 if agent j wants to punish agent i (ie, p
i
j > 0).
If a consensus to punish cannot be reached, punishment requests will bear no costs on
the punisher and the non-punished individual will maintain their net private endowment
that remains after any successful punishment requests of their own. In the event that
total punishment reductions exceed the punished player’s remaining funds, the punished
player is left with a zero payoff and no rebate will be given to punishers for points allo-
cated beyond the punished player’s remaining funds.
If the threshold is not met, each agent additionally faces a treatment assigned proba-
bilistic risk (ri) of losing remaining net private payoffs, resulting in expected earnings of
E(ΠCi ) = ri(0) + (1− ri)pici = (1− ri)pici .28 (1.6)
28Contrasting Casari and Luini (2009), this setup does not prevent the formation of reputation during
the game and allows delayed punishment.
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1.3.4 Questionnaire
The questionnaire distributed at the conclusion of the four games collected socioeco-
nomic information (gender, age, number of siblings, college major, political party affili-
ation, tuition source, etc.) and elicited beliefs regarding the responsibilities of the rich
and poor to contribute toward a public good. In addition to fairness beliefs and trust, I
also gauged the influence of risk and predetermined play on an individual’s contribution
choices. Subjects were asked to identify the main driver for their cooperative behavior in
the threshold PGG (predetermined endowment inequality, cumulative group investments
starting in round 4, monetary self-interest, fairness considerations, or achievement of the
targeted threshold). Select summary statistics are presented in Figure 1.10.
1.4 Hypotheses
Collective action is difficult to sustain in multi-period public goods games. Though
empirical evidence reveals non-zero contributions in contrast to the dominant strategy of
free riding, cooperation in repeated play games tapers off rendering the socially efficient
outcome unachievable. Acknowledging general findings from the literature regarding
decreasing (stable) contributions in threshold PGGs without (with) punishment, hetero-
geneous asymmetries along the dimensions of endowment and risk further complicate
cooperation.
Group Behavior, External Factors
Hypothesis 1a: Across non- or pro-punishment treatments, increased homogeneous
risk will increase group contributions while heterogenous risk will impede coopera-
tion.
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Hypothesis 1b: Punishment will lead to higher group contributions and greater thresh-
old attainment, relative to their non-punishment counterparts.
While high levels of homogeneous collective risk have induced cooperative behavior
in experimental games (Milinski et al., 2008), heterogeneous risk factors coupled with en-
dowment inequality is conjectured to hinder cooperative inclinations when punishment
is not available. Along the single dimension of endowment inequality with homogeneous
risks, Tavoni et al. (2011) showed that collective efforts to reach a target threshold are
impaired if no coordination-inducing mechanism is introduced. As punishment has been
shown to have a positive impact on group behavior, I predict it will increase cooperation
among low-risk treatments and align interests in heterogeneous risk groups.
Individual Behavior, External Factors
Hypothesis 2a: Poorly endowed individuals will give relatively less than richer group
members, across like risk treatments. Conditional cooperation by “poor” players is
anticipated if “rich” group members signal willingness to contribute in early rounds.
Hypothesis 2b: Identically endowed players with high-risk factors will systematically
contribute more than group members with low-risk factors.
Hypothesis 2c: Punishment possibilities will serve as a coordination-inducing mech-
anism to further close the contribution gap between differently endowed participants.
Although both endowment and risk inequality figure to impact individual contribu-
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tions, I hypothesize that the former asymmetry will be the more salient factor influ-
encing choices. Given the immediate specification delegating two individuals poorer in
endowment than the remaining group members, this attribute figures to be the defining
influence in early periods for individuals with high discount rates and who lack forward-
looking tendencies. Large initial endowments and high risk factors will induce risk-averse
behavior among “rich” participants who have a significant incentive to protect their pri-
vate account, leading these individuals to contribute a relatively greater share of their
endowment to threshold attainment. Poor subjects with lower initial endowments will
conditionally cooperate if significant early contributions are made by those with higher
endowments, signaling an intent to reduce distributional endowment inequality. In pun-
ishment treatments, available sanctions may further increase the gap in contributions
among poor and richly endowed individuals given the mechanism’s credible threat.
I anticipate that equally endowed individuals with high-risk factors will contribute
relatively more than identically endowed low-risk individuals, given their greater sus-
ceptibility to economic ruin. It remains an empirical question whether lowly-endowed
high-risk subjects contribute a greater relative share of their initial endowment compared
to highly-endowed low-risk subjects.
A punishment mechanism will induce greater responsibility for rich subjects to close
the inequality gap, as fairness concerns can only be solved with mirrored inequality in
distributional contributions. Incorporating only punishment may improve upon simul-
taneous punishment and communication mechanisms by making threats credible and
diluting the existence of cheap talk (Bochet et al., 2006). In heterogenous risk groups, a
consensual punishment mechanism should increasingly help eliminate anti-group behav-
ior relative to homogeneous treatments.
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Individual Behavior, Internal Factors
Hypothesis 3: High risk aversion will induce larger contributions to the group ac-
count across equally endowed individuals. High levels of inequality aversion motivate
cooperation, but combined with endowment inequality will impact “rich” and “poor”
players differently.
Though I randomly assign endowment and risk factor inequality among participants,
inequality and risk aversion will also impact decision-making. Risk aversion should induce
individuals with high risk factors to contribute more to the public good. Disadvanta-
geous inequality aversion should negatively impact contribution levels of poorly endowed
subjects and to a greater degree among individuals with low risk factors. Examining im-
plications from Fehr and Schmidt (1999), this experiment is able to test the validity that
subjects with high levels of advantageous inequality aversion are more likely to cooperate
in the public goods game.
Group Behavior, Internal Factors
Hypothesis 4: Larger mean levels of risk or inequality aversion among group mem-
bers will positively impact total contributions, but a greater variance between group
members will inhibit threshold attainment.
While individuals marginally impact the final outcome, group composition and col-
lective intrinsic preferences can greatly influence cooperation. Assigned risk and endow-
ment profiles are explicit barriers to cooperation, however, groups have a better chance of
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overcoming these obstacles if they share similar risk and inequality aversion preferences.
Larger group means for these intrinsic parameters should impact group contributions and
threshold attainment similar to individual measures. Greater variation in these measures
should negatively impact group cooperation.
1.5 Instrument Check
This section reports trends in the estimation of aversion instruments (see Sections
1.3.1 and 1.3.2 for experimental design), identifies suboptimal decisions among partici-
pants, and analyzes how these results compare to those of prior research.
1.5.1 Risk Aversion Estimation
Endowed with 100 tokens and permitted to invest any portion of this amount in a risky
asset that returned 2.5 times the amount invested if successful, the average investment
amount was about 46 tokens. The estimated risk aversion parameter ranged from 0 to
32.48, representing risk-loving preferences and relative “extreme” risk aversion.29 The
average 46 token investment is associated with a risk aversion parameter equal to 0.755.
29This estimation procedure produces a range of risk aversion estimates that is strictly contingent on
the specified utility function. Qualitatively, a one-unit increase in the estimated risk aversion parameter
does not yield interpretive value beyond being more risk averse relative to another individual. Similar
risk elicitation experiments (see Holt and Laury (2002)) produce their own arbitrary range of estimated
risk preferences that do not always correlate with the slew of alternate methods. Specifically, my chosen
procedure to derive point-estimates for risk aversion does not correlate well with Holt’s interval elicitation
method, whose method I also used in the end-of-experiment questionnaire. A main reason for this
deviation is that Holt’s method restricts possible risk aversion into 11 distinct values while the Charness
and Genicot (2009) point-estimate method produced 28 separate risk aversion values determined by the
amount individuals invested (i.e., there were 28 distinct investment choices among the participants).
Comparing the two methods, it is possible that no systematic relationship exists as an increase in the
point-estimate risk aversion for Person i may not find itself in a higher Holt risk aversion category, but
instead assigned to the same category given the non-comparable cutoff points for this method. When
testing for correlation between the two methods, any possible association (positive, negative, none) may
be anticipated for the above reasons. With this insight, I restrict my analysis to point-estimates for risk
aversion and avoid interval estimates.
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As noted earlier, the endpoints of potential investment do not allow for explicit point-
estimation of the risk aversion parameter. Of the 216 participants, 26 chose to invest
the full 100 token endowment and 1 chose to invest nothing. These extreme choices were
coded in accordance with suggestions from Charness and Genicot (2009). Further, 71%
of participants chose to invest 50 or fewer tokens.
1.5.2 Inequality Aversion Estimation
In the ultimatum game, used to estimate disadvantageous inequality aversion (α),
proposers offered a share of the 20 token pie which the responder could accept or decline.
The proposers’ mean offer was 44% of the pie, in line with an average offer of 40% in
Blanco et al. (2011). About 57% of the proposers offered the even (10,10) split, while
eight individuals proposed offers greater than half of the pie.30 A mere 3% of offers were
consistent with the profit-maximizing subgame perfect equilibrium of offering nothing or
1 token. Employing the strategy method by presenting each of the 21 possible Proposer-
Responder allocations, I sought to find each individual’s switching point from rejection
to accepting the proposed offer. The average switching point occurred in between alloca-
tions (14,6) and (13,7), with participants being amenable to offers that exceeded about
33% of the pie.31 Roughly 76% of participants would accept an offer less than the egali-
tarian (10,10) payoff distribution.
In the modified dictator game to measure advantageous inequality aversion (β), play-
ers decided between a selfish (20,0) allocation that benefited the dictator and an increas-
30Offers from the ultimatum game have been used to derive advantageous inequality aversion (see
Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), however, Blanco et al. (2011) points out certain restrictions and thus I defer
to the MDG game to estimate this preference more aptly.
31Among the ultimatum and modified dictator games, non-unique switching points occurred in 12%
of cases, less than the 15.3% observed in Blanco et al. (2011). Holt and Laury (2002) present a similar
format to the UG and find that 18.9% of participants do not have well-behaved preferences. See Footnote
17 for handling these participants.
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ing equitable payoff vector (xi, xi). The mean switching point occurred just after (9,9)
and 31% of participants switched to the equal payoff at or before (9,9). The modal switch-
ing point was at (10,10), a level 31% of participants chose as their personal threshold
between choosing the selfish payoff and the egalitarian outcome. Eleven (5%) individuals
never deviate from the (20,0) option and thus do not exhibit any advantageous inequality
aversion (βi = 0). On the opposite side of the spectrum 7 (3%) participants chose the eq-
uitable outcome for each of the 21 decisions and are characterized as extremely averse to
advantageous inequality (βi = 1). A total of 7 (3%) participants switch to the equitable
choice only when it is costless (i.e., at the (20,20) payoff). These results are comparable
to the findings in similar dictator games. Blanco et al. (2011) find a mean switching point
around (11,11). They report that 8% of players only switch to the egalitarian outcome
when it is costless and 10% never switch from the (20,0) option, preferring this outcome
over (20,20).
Across aversion estimates, there is wide berth of heterogeneity among subjects. Over
87% of subjects display aversion to both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality
(β > 0 and α > 0), while only 2% can be characterized as purely stoic (β = 0 and α = 0).
Exploring the independence between the parameters, advantageous and disadvantageous
inequality aversion are not correlated (Spearman correlation test, p=0.533).32 Figure 1.1
corroborates this test and exhibits a wide distribution among the subject population.
Further, I find that 65 of 216 participants (about 30%) violate Fehr and Schmidt’s as-
sumption that αi ≥ βi. These individuals are represented by points to the left of the line
“α = β” in Figure 1.1. In addition to a lack of correlation between the two inequality
aversion parameters, I also find no significant correlation between risk aversion and ad-
32This result violates the assumptions by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) that the two factors are positively
correlated, but Teyssier (2012) and Blanco et al. (2011) have since exhibited the lack of correlation in
empirical studies.
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vantageous inequality aversion (Spearman test, p=0.224) or disadvantageous inequality
aversion (Spearman test, p=0.182), consistent with prior empirical findings.
Figure 1.1: Joint (α, β) distribution. Each dot in the figure represents an individual’s
inequality aversion parameters.
1.6 Results
In this section, I first present aggregate summary statistics and trends from the
threshold public goods game, then report observable differences in contribution levels
by treatment, period, and player type. The following sub-section is devoted to statisti-
cal tests that establish the impact of external factors (risk, inequality, and punishment)
on dynamic behavior. Lastly, I delve into the impact of intrinsic preferences on group
cooperation and investigate my hypotheses.
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1.6.1 Summary Statistics from TPGG
Individual Mean Contributions
Individual mean contribution trends in the aggregate setting of all treatments (Table
1.2) center around the symmetric equilibrium of 2 token contributions in rounds 4-8. In-
ducing inequality in rounds 1-3, recall that participants were subjected to three inactive
contribution periods, forcing half of group members to give 4 tokens while the other half
were forced to contribute nothing. By construction individual mean contributions in the
three inactive periods was exactly 2 tokens and I refrain from posting summary statistics
from predetermined play. Rounds 9 and 10 see a drop in contributions as group totals
approach the established threshold. Refining analysis to treatments grouped by the ex-
istence of punishment (last two columns), larger individual mean contributions occur
in punishment treatments up to and including round 7. In the later rounds (8-10) the
trend between these two comparison groups is reversed as participants in the punishment
treatment scale back contributions more quickly as they approach the threshold.
Investigating mean individual contributions by treatment reveals similar results. Treat-
ments without punishment options (T1, T3, & T5) generally under contribute relative
to their punishment counterparts in the initial active contribution rounds (4-7). Homo-
geneous high-risk groups (T3 & T4), however, contribute similar amounts irrespective of
the existence of punishment. I return to this point following proper testing for statis-
tical differences. Across non-punishment treatments, homogeneous low-risk individuals
contribute relatively less than those in high-risk or heterogeneous groups. Between ho-
mogeneous high-risk (T3) and heterogeneous risk (T5) individuals, those in the former
treatment gave larger amounts on average in the initial contribution rounds, potentially
highlighting the absence of accountability among group members in the heterogeneous
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Table 1.2: Mean Individual Contributions (Threshold PGG)
Aggregate by Treatment by Punishment
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 No Yes
Round 4 2.08 1.72 2.22 1.83 2.44 1.83 2.44 1.80 2.37
Round 5 2.11 1.67 2.11 2.39 2.28 1.89 2.33 1.98 2.24
Round 6 2.09 1.78 2.22 2.33 2.17 1.72 2.33 1.94 2.24
Round 7 2.10 1.56 2.11 2.28 2.28 2.17 2.22 2.00 2.20
Round 8 2.01 1.94 2.00 2.11 1.83 2.22 1.94 2.09 1.93
Round 9 1.73 1.56 2.06 1.83 1.94 1.89 1.11 1.76 1.70
Round 10 1.64 1.61 1.67 1.78 2.11 1.56 1.11 1.65 1.63
Rds 4 to 10 1.97 1.69 2.06 2.08 2.15 1.90 1.93 1.89 2.04
N 216 36 36 36 36 36 36 108 108
T1: Homo (1/3) Risk, Non-Punish T2: Homo (1/3) Risk, Punish
T3: Homo (2/3) Risk, Non-Punish T4: Homo (2/3) Risk, Punish
T5: Hetero Risk, Non-Punish T6: Hetero Risk, Punish
treatment. Across punishing treatments, contribution levels are consistently higher than
the symmetric 2 token contribution equilibrium in early active rounds and slightly larger
in groups containing high-risk individuals.
Examining coordination during early and late rounds, Figure 1.2 helps visualize the
dynamics of individual behavior across treatments. Bar columns in this figure represent
the average number of times group members contributed 0, 2, or 4 experimental tokens
(ETs) during early and late rounds, by treatment.33 For example, in Panel A the initial
value of 4.3 represents the mean number of times individuals in Treatment 1 contributed
0 ETs in early rounds (5-7).34 Among all treatments, free riding increases as the game
33Round 4 is excluded from this analysis for two reasons: (i) to compare “early” versus “late” round
dynamics, each bin needed to contain an equal number of rounds, and (ii) decisions made in Round
4 more closely reflect inequality or risk aversion preferences as active group interaction has not yet
occurred.
34Note that all bars in a panel sum to 24 which represents the total number of decisions made by four
group members in rounds 5-10.
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progresses which can be for one of two reasons: either (i) individuals give up their pursuit
of an unattainable threshold and hold on to remaining net private endowments or (ii) con-
tributions are scaled back as groups approach the collective threshold. In homogeneous
low-risk groups without punishment (Panel A), relatively high levels of early free riding
increase, overwhelming a modest increase in 4 token contributions in late periods. Over
half of contributions in low-risk punishment groups (Panel B) were for the 2 token level,
while low levels of 0 and 4 token contributions balanced each other out. Homogeneous
high-risk treatments (Panels C & D) exhibit nearly identical early and late round con-
tribution trends, enjoying relatively high levels of 2 and 4 token contributions. Coupled
with low levels of free riding, these two treatments combined to reach the threshold 83%
of the time. Lastly, the punishment mechanism had a visible impact on contributions
over time in heterogeneous groups. Without the overt punishment threat (Panel E), a
coordination failure occurs with both an increase in free riding and 4 token contributions
in late rounds. Punishment possibilities induce cooperation and Treatment 6 (Panel F)
enjoys the highest level of early round 4 token contributions. Large early contributions
are complemented by increased free riding and decreased 4 token contributions in late
periods as players scale back investments with a quickly approaching threshold.
Among all punishment treatments, free riding is mild in early rounds compared to
non-punishment groups (p=0.078) as players coordinate investments toward the collective
fund. Large contributions regularly decrease in late periods, but only after threshold
attainment is nearly guaranteed. Relatively high levels of early free riding is observable
across non-punishment treatments, and without the threat of retribution continues into
late rounds as large contributions cannot compensate to avoid threshold non-attainment.
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Figure 1.2: Round Dynamics
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Table 1.3: Mean Group End-of-Round Contribution Totals (Threshold PGG)
Aggregate by Treatment by Punishment
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 No Yes
Round 4 32.33 30.89 32.89 31.33 33.78 31.33 33.78 31.19 33.48
Round 5 40.78 37.56 41.33 40.89 42.89 38.89 43.11 39.11 42.44
Round 6 49.15 44.67 50.22 50.22 51.56 45.78 52.44 46.89 51.41
Round 7 57.56 50.89 58.67 59.33 60.67 54.44 61.33 54.89 60.22
Round 8 65.59 58.67 66.67 67.78 68.00 63.33 69.11 63.26 67.93
Round 9 72.52 64.89 74.89 75.11 75.78 70.89 73.56 70.30 74.74
Round 10 79.07 71.33 81.56 82.22 84.22 77.11 78.00 76.89 81.26
N 54 9 9 9 9 9 9 27 27
T1: Homo (1/3) Risk, Non-Punish T2: Homo (1/3) Risk, Punish
T3: Homo (2/3) Risk, Non-Punish T4: Homo (2/3) Risk, Punish
T5: Hetero Risk, Non-Punish T6: Hetero Risk, Punish
End-of-Round Aggregates
Exploring end-of-round total contributions (Table 1.3), I evaluate how groups across
treatments differ in their pursuit of the collective threshold and Section 1.6.2 presents sta-
tistical testing. Among all treatment groups, the mean total contribution after ten rounds
of play was about 79 tokens, marginally missing the threshold on average. Distinguishing
by threshold attainment, 43 of the 54 groups (80%) were successful in meeting the target
(80 tokens) with an average group contribution of 83.2 tokens, while the 11 groups that
failed collected an average of 62.9 tokens after ten rounds. Of the non-attainment groups,
7 of the 11 groups were from non-punishment treatments with an average contribution of
59.4 tokens, while the remaining four from punishment treatments averaged 69 tokens.
Breaking down the temporal momentum of total group contributions aiming for
threshold attainment (Table 1.3), I find similar patterns to those observed among in-
dividual contributions. Non-punishment treatments systematically produce lower con-
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tribution totals after every round relative to their punishment counterparts, both in the
aggregate and in pairwise comparisons. At the end of ten rounds, punishment treatments
on average attain the threshold (81.3 tokens) while non-punishment treatments fail (76.9
tokens). Although there is a sizable increase in group contributions after 10 rounds in
punishment treatments relative to their non-punishment baselines, in reality, the former
achieves the threshold 85% of the time with the latter not far off at 74% achievement.
Whether or not a complex punishment mechanism is necessary to induce cooperation to
reliable levels will be explored in the coming analysis.
In determining the impact of the punishment mechanism, I examine final contribution
totals among the treatments with their punishment counterparts. In homogeneous low-
risk treatments, punishment induces a sizable increase in total contributions to the group
fund, pushing the average total (81.6 tokens) beyond the targeted threshold. Further,
the number of groups failing to reach the threshold decreased by 67% with the inclusion
of the punishment mechanism. When groups were characterized by only high-risk mem-
bers (T3 & T4), both treatments on average achieve the threshold and punishment is
potentially not necessary. Heterogeneous groups, with and without punishment, appear
to be plagued by a coordination issue as these treatments on average do not attain the
threshold. Delving deeper, however, both treatments bear one group with a very low
contribution total, dragging down their respective mean contribution totals. Excluding
these possible outliers, the mean contribution totals were 79.3 and 82.0 for the non- and
pro-punishment treatments, exhibiting the positive impact of a coordination-inducing
mechanism when agents are heterogeneous along two dimensions (risk & endowment).
Similar to the homogeneous low-risk treatment, the inclusion of a punishment option
decreased the number of groups failing to reach the threshold by 67 percent.
41
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
Player-Type Dynamics
Lastly, I examine individual contribution trends by player type (Figure 1.3). Amidst
the mix of homogeneous, heterogeneous, and punishment groupings, there were four
types of players that varied according to endowment and assigned risk factor: rich/low-
risk (P1), rich/high-risk (P2), poor/low-risk (P3), and poor/high-risk (P4). Although I
avoid the wording in the actual experiment, “rich” players are those who started round
4 with a 40 token net endowment (forced to contribute nothing during the three inactive
rounds) and “poor” players are those who were forced to contribute 4 tokens per inac-
tive round, starting round 4 with a 28 token net endowment. Observing active period
(round>3) mean contributions in Figure 1.3, there is a propensity for rich individuals to
not only contribute more than the 2 token symmetric equilibrium (p=0.000)35, but also
to contribute more on average than their poor-player counterparts regardless of punish-
ment possibilities (p=0.000 for both low-risk and high-risk types). Such a result suggests
that rich players sought to correct the endowment inequality induced at the start of the
game, irrespective of the punishment threat. Further, high-risk players unequivocally
give more than low-risk players on average (p=0.000). Disaggregating by punishment
possibilities, the mechanism imparts greater contributions for most player types (P1-P3)
while only player type P4 realizes a decrease in contributions when punishment is present.
Testing for significance, low-risk player (P1 & P3) contributions increase (p=0.013 and
p=0.078, respectively) with the punishment mechanism. Threatened by punishment,
rich high-risk players (P2) have plenty to lose and contribute more (p=0.112) relative
to non-punishment treatments, while contributions decrease for poor high-risk players
(P4) (p=0.717). These results suggest that at the individual level punishment is effective
as a coordination-inducing mechanism when risk is low, but when risk factors are high
35All p-values are two-tailed unless noted otherwise.
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punishment does not significantly increase contributions to the target fund.
Figure 1.3: Mean Individual Contributions, by Player Type (Threshold PGG)
Though rich players contribute more on average across all treatments during active
periods (Figure 1.3), the question persists as to whether threshold attainment is char-
acterized by equalizing the contribution burden between rich and poor players within
groups. Modeling endowment inequality by inducing predetermined play for the first
three rounds, it is constructive to examine the share of total contributions from rich and
poor players during the entire game. In addition to varying degrees of risk susceptibility,
unequal endowments serve as a barrier to cooperation that can only be overcome with
sufficient redistribution of contribution responsibilities to offset the induced inequality.
Scaling up mean contributions for active periods in Figure 1.3 and including predeter-
mined play contributions, I find that although rich players gave more in active periods,
they did not fully close the inequality gap for equal burden sharing.36 Figure 1.4 high-
lights this point for all treatments, where poor-player contributions make up 58% of the
collective fund while rich players contributed 42% of the group total. Distinguishing by
36Relative to non-attainment groups, the questionnaire revealed individuals from successful groups
increasingly preferred higher contributions from rich players in active rounds (p=0.085). Both attainment
types agreed that poor players were not exclusively responsible for increasing their contributions relative
to rich players (p=0.668). Further breaking down beliefs, within non-attainment groups rich players
significantly disagree with poor players that it is their social responsibility to contribute more in active
rounds (questionnaire response, p=0.051).
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threshold attainment in Panel B, successful groups decrease the inequality gap by about
4 percentage points relative to failing groups (p=0.069). Panels C and D in Figure 1.4
break down rich and poor contribution shares with the introduction of the punishment
mechanism. In both non- and pro-punishment treatments, successful threshold attain-
ment is characterized by reducing the inequality gap beyond the all treatments case (panel
A). Without a punishment mechanism (Panel C), successful groups close the inequality
gap by over 6 percentage points (p=0.052) relative to non-successful groups. Both failing
and successful groups in punishment treatments (Panel D) outperform all other specifi-
cations in the quest to equalize contribution shares, however, successful groups do not
close the inequality gap any better than failing groups (p=0.592). Never quite achieving
full burden sharing, the punishment mechanism successfully reduces the inequality gap
which increases the likelihood of threshold attainment.
Signaling cooperation and a willingness to equalize burden sharing, immediate con-
tributions in Round 4 play an important role in successful threshold attainment. Across
all treatments (Figure 1.5) rich players, regardless of risk type, contribute over a full
token more than poor players in Round 4 (p=0.000). Assessing how larger initial con-
tributions by rich players translate into successful cooperation, I break down the data
by non-attainment and attainment. Among rich players (P1 & P2), those in success-
ful groups gave significantly more on average in Round 4 than those in failing groups
(p=0.043). Among poor players (P3 & P4), there was no significant difference in con-
tributions between those in successful or failing groups (p=0.313). Applying a simple
probit model to ascertain the significance of Round 4 contributions among rich and poor
players in reaching the threshold, I further substantiate the importance of rich player
contributions (p=0.050) and the non-significance of poor player contributions (p=0.308).
These results stress the importance of immediate signaling by rich players in Round 4 to
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Figure 1.4: Contribution Shares
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influence threshold attainment.
Figure 1.5: Round 4 - Mean Individual Contributions, by Player Type (Threshold PGG)
1.6.2 Statistical Tests of Group Contributions
On the surface there appears to be a detectable difference between mean contribu-
tions with and without a punishment mechanism. With only nine groups per treatment
there is insufficient power when testing for differences between final end-game contri-
bution totals. Since participants contribute personal endowments to a group fund for
ten rounds and scale back investments as the total gradually reaches the predetermined
threshold, end-game totals among all treatments hover above and below the threshold
without significant variation in end-game totals.
Acknowledging the above issues, I test for statistical differences in contributions by
round among the treatments. It is constructive to compare mean group-period contribu-
tions, by treatment, to establish a set of stylized facts consistent among the data. Mean
group-period contributions relate average contributions by group, period, and treatment
for all active group play (rounds 4-10). The values of this metric can be derived from
Table 1.2, multiplying each number by four to account for the complete group. Figure 1.7
tests for differences among all combinations of treatments. The first reported statistic in
each column relates two-sided p-values (unless noted otherwise) for statistical differences
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when comparing low/high-risk homogeneous and heterogeneous groups to their punish-
ment counterparts. Of these comparisons, only the low-risk homogeneous treatment is
statistically different than its pro-punishment alternative (p=0.009) which is consistent
with the findings reported in the prior section, comparing mean end-of-round contribu-
tion totals among treatments. Varying risk and group composition, I assess differences
among treatments in the same punishment category. For non-punishment treatments,
homogeneous low-risk groups statistically under contribute relative to high-risk and het-
erogenous groups.37 High-risk homogeneous groups are not plagued by coordination
issues and significantly contribute more on average per period relative to heterogeneous
groups (one-sided, p=0.092). With regard to punishment treatments, varying risk and
group composition, no statistical differences exist. This finding suggests that a consen-
sual punishment mechanism may be the “great equalizer” that eliminates the differences
in mean contributions among treatments with different group compositions. While per-
ceived risk levels (be they uniformly high, low, or heterogeneous) to dangerous climate
change are privately developed in the real world, experimentally I find that a punish-
ment mechanism ensures almost universal threshold attainment regardless of the validity
of personal risk beliefs.
Analyzing all active rounds (4-10) abstracts away from particular trademarks of
threshold public goods games. Threshold attainment during group play is usually achieved
in one of two general ways: (i) group contributions start strong and taper off as the thresh-
old is approached or (ii) group contributions are humble in early periods and ramp up
with the looming threat of non-attainment. While it is uncertain if a punishment threat
37Comparing non-punishment homogeneous low-risk groups (T1) with heterogeneous groups (T5),
I employ a one-sided t-test. The null hypothesis is that though heterogeneity impedes cooperation,
the existence of high-risk individuals in the heterogeneous group (T5) relative to uniformly low-risk
individual groups (T1) increases the mean contribution level in the heterogeneous group. Similar logic
is used with statistics reported alongside an asterisk (*).
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among individuals is relevant during the entire game or instead gains traction in later
periods, there exists a consistent downshift in mean group contributions (Figure 1.6)
between early active rounds (4-8) and late active rounds (9-10).38 Failure to partition
contributions in this fashion conceals the impact of a punishment mechanism on early co-
operation. Including all active periods in Figure 1.7, there was no statistical improvement
in mean contributions among heterogeneous groups (T5 & T6) when including punish-
ment. In Figure 1.8 I restrict analysis to “early” active round contributions to determine
the early impact of punishment across treatments. All statistical differences, both in
direction and significance, found in the prior section (see Figure 1.7) are identical, bar
two. I find a significant difference in mean contributions between heterogeneous groups
with (T6) and without (T5) punishment options. Looking at all active rounds (4-10) in
Figure 1.6, Treatment 6 experiences a large decrease in mean contributions between these
early and late rounds while Treatment 5 did not experience a dramatic downshift. The
result of this sizable difference is that averaged over all active rounds (4-10), as reflected
in Figure 1.7, there is no significant difference between T5 and T6 contributions, thus
no detectable impact of punishment on heterogeneous group behavior. In Figure 1.8,
however, I find that punishment indeed had the intended effect (p=0.057) in overcoming
coordination issues among heterogeneous agents, although did not push average group
contributions over the target threshold (Table 1.3). Lastly, when parsing out the strong
early round mean contributions (9.02) in Treatment 6 from the significant decrease in the
later rounds (4.44), I find that there is no statistical difference in mean contributions be-
tween punishment treatments with homogeneous high-risk (T4) and heterogeneous (T6)
agents (p=0.726).
38“Early” and “late” active round designations are arbitrary. Results are qualitatively robust for other
specifications: (i) early rounds (4-7), late rounds (8-10); (ii) early rounds (5-7), late rounds (8-10) as in
Figure 1.2.
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Figure 1.6: Mean Group Period Contributions, by Treatment (Threshold PGG)
Summarizing Section 1.6.1 and 1.6.2 results, I arrive at a handful of key points:
• Observation #1: Punishment is only effective when perceived risk is low enough
among homogeneous or heterogeneous agents
• Observation #2: Coordination issues (without punishment) are overcome if per-
ceived risk is high enough
• Observation #3: Punishment may be the “great equalizer” by eliminating total
contribution differences between homogenous and heterogenous groups
• Observation #4: Individual accountability in heterogeneous groups is heightened
with a punishment mechanism
• Observation #5: Rich players significantly reduce, but do not eliminate, the en-
dowment inequality gap in successful groups
• Observation #6: Rich players who signal early cooperation significantly increase
threshold attainment
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Figure 1.7: Round > 3
Figure 1.8: Rounds 4-8
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1.6.3 Regression Analysis
External factors including endowment inequality, risk susceptibility, and punishment
have been shown to impact contributions and threshold attainment across treatments,
however, I have neglected the role of intrinsic preferences that also influence behavior.
Incorporating inequality and risk aversion measures from the three independent games
prior to the threshold game, I investigate the behavioral preferences that both encourage
and inhibit cooperation in the collective-risk public goods setting. With the same set
of incentives and constraints, assessing the impact of intrinsic preferences helps identify
why similar treatment groups fail to cooperate while others effectively reach the collective
threshold.
Collecting repeated decisions from a fixed number of individuals and groups, the ex-
perimental data is best analyzed in a panel setting. Before incorporating intrinsic pref-
erences, I first consider the impact of external factors (inequality, risk, and punishment)
to corroborate findings from the previous sections. Table 1.4 presents a random-effects
model for individual contributions to the group account during active periods (Round >
3). Across all models, lagged group contributions significantly increase an individual’s
choice to contribute, signaling the typical preference for cooperation as the social norm
materializes. Isolating the impact of lagged contributions from other group members (i.e.,
without player i), however, an individual’s contribution significantly decreases showcas-
ing a propensity to free-ride that may negate cooperative behavior even when considering
the deterrents of punishment and collective risk. Increased risk susceptibility and lower
relative endowments each have the predicted impact on behavior, significantly increasing
and decreasing, respectively, an individual’s contribution during active periods. While
the magnitude of these opposing forces indicate that relatively low endowments have
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a greater impact on contributions than do high risk factors, for individuals with both
high risk and low endowments an interaction term reveals a non-significant combined
effect. Lastly after controlling for risk and endowment factors, the punishment mecha-
nism had the intended effect as it significantly increased contributions toward the public
good, consistent with prior quantitative findings. Increasing risk susceptibility and rel-
ative wealth can significantly impact cooperative behavior, but on average these factors
alone do not incentivize ubiquitous threshold attainment (see Section 1.6.1). With re-
spect to the social planner, this is an important result as it highlights the necessity of a
cooperation-inducing mechanism to efficiently attain the targeted threshold.
Modeling intrinsic preferences alongside external pressures in Table 1.5, I increase the
dimensions by which the rationale of individual behavior can be identified. Excluding
from the output external factors modeled in Table 1.4 (all of which maintain their signs
and noted significances), varying levels of risk and inequality aversion have a marked
impact on individual contributions. In a game shaped by contrived collective risk, risk
averse tendencies might conceivably bring about increased contributions. In the Model
4 random-effects regression, however, elicited risk aversion preferences are found to neg-
atively impact contributions, albeit at a small magnitude. Though risk averse agents
may contribute more in the threshold game to avoid non-attainment, risk aversion has
been found to reduce individual contributions in group games with strategic uncertainty
(Teyssier, 2012). Not only are agents internalizing their inherited risk susceptibility, they
face the risk of heterogeneous group members failing to cooperate. This two-pronged
risk dilemma (with opposite effects) may explain the negative significance of elicited risk
aversion.39 Carrying greater weight in magnitude, both advantageous and disadvanta-
39These results are further explored when evaluating questionnaire responses later in the analysis.
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Table 1.4: Individual Contributions to Group Account (External Factors)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Group Contrib, (t-1) 0.067∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Dist2Thresh 0.009∗∗∗ -0.000 0.002
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
High Risk 0.381∗∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.269∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.15)
Poor -0.865∗∗∗ -0.845∗∗∗ -1.077∗∗∗
(0.11) (0.10) (0.34)
Group Contrib (others), (t-1) -0.099∗∗∗ -0.099∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03)
High Risk*Poor 0.464
(0.60)
Punish 0.266∗
(0.15)
constant 1.487∗∗∗ 1.809∗∗ 1.573∗∗
(0.26) (0.78) (0.76)
Period Dummies no yes yes
Treatment Dummies yes yes yes
R2 0.324 0.476 0.474
N 1512 1512 1512
Wald 125.868 266.135 302.473
Note: Analysis for active contribution rounds (4-10) only
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level)
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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geous inequality aversion (representing guilt and envy) significantly increase individual
contributions, with the former parameter nearly ten times as influential. This result
stands in stark contrast to those found in Blanco et al. (2011), where Fehr and Schmidt’s
inequality-aversion model had little explanatory power in a one-shot simultaneous public
goods game at the individual level.40 In the threshold PGG with constant groups and
multiple rounds, players dynamically incur bouts of envy and guilt during the course of
the game, thus the saliency of their significant impacts. Punishment continues to increase
contributions even when controlling for the wide range of internal and external factors
influencing behavior.
Although aversion preferences are shown to influence behavior, anecdotal evidence
suggests that these internal factors may impact unequally endowed individuals differ-
ently. Under the stress of strategic uncertainty during the multi-round game, risk aver-
sion negatively impacts contributions. After interacting risk aversion with inherited low
endowments, however, I find that this interaction is significantly negative while the con-
ditional effect of risk aversion on rich agents is positive without significance (Model 5).
Whereas external high-risk susceptibility coupled with poor endowments had no marked
impact on contributions (Table 1.4), higher levels of risk aversion coupled with poor
endowments increase distrust among participants leading to decreased cooperation. A
possible explanation gleaned from the questionnaire is that the risk aversion measure, as
priorly maintained, more closely models distrust between participants. Poorly endowed
players exhibited lower levels of trust41, anticipating richer group members to not de-
40Similarly in a one-shot sequential public goods game, Teyssier (2012) finds that disadvantageous in-
equality aversion does not impact the first mover, but advantageous inequality aversion does significantly
increase the second mover’s contributions.
41The final question on Game 4 in the questionnaire (Figure 1.10) highlights accountability beliefs
and trust. This question asks players if they believe “richly” endowed players would contribute a higher
share than poor players during active rounds. While rich types (P1 & P2) agreed with this sentiment,
poor types (P3 & P4) on average “neither agree or disagree,” suggesting lower levels of trust in rich
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crease endowment inequality by giving a larger proportional share during active rounds.
Highlighted in Figure 1.5, however, signaling from rich players in the first active round
(Round 4) reverses this trend as poor players on average increased their contributions in
response to the positive signal of cooperation. Although I hypothesized that higher levels
of (dis)advantageous inequality aversion would significantly (decrease) increase individual
contributions among the (poor) rich, there were no detectable effects. Game dynamics
increasing or decreasing the inequality gap, rich and poor designations do not explic-
itly vary the overall impact of inequality aversion. Accounting for period and treatment
dummies (Model 6) marginally increases model fit and maintains sign and significance
for all regressors.
Outside of individual preferences marginally impacting game dynamics, group compo-
sition and collective intrinsic preferences can significantly influence cooperation. Across
all pooled treatments (first column of Figure 1.9), prior round cooperation and the exis-
tence of punishment both significantly increase group contributions. Mean and standard
deviation measures for aversion preferences reveal random group composition. Compa-
rable to the individual analysis, higher levels of mean advantageous inequality aversion
(eAIA) significantly increase group cooperation, while increasing levels of mean risk aver-
sion continue to decrease levels of trust and negatively impact contributions. Increasing
variation among the envy parameter (eDIA) and risk aversion, however, negate high
levels of distrust and instead positively contribute to the collective fund.
Examining each risk treatment in turn (inclusive of punishment possibilities), a clearer
story unfolds. Punishment in homogeneous low-risk groups continues to incentivize co-
agents to reduce the endowment inequality gap.
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Table 1.5: Individual Contributions to Group Account (Internal Factors)
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
eRisk -0.038∗∗∗ 0.106 0.103
(0.01) (0.09) (0.10)
eAIA 0.594∗∗∗ 0.435∗ 0.428∗
(0.21) (0.24) (0.23)
eDIA 0.064∗∗ 0.024 0.022
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
Punish 0.145∗ 0.125∗ 0.272∗
(0.08) (0.07) (0.16)
eRisk*Poor -0.155∗ -0.149∗
(0.09) (0.08)
eAIA*Rich 0.419 0.433
(0.38) (0.48)
eDIA*Poor 0.068 0.072
(0.05) (0.05)
constant 0.877∗∗∗ 0.730∗∗ 0.802
(0.29) (0.33) (0.72)
Period Dummies no no yes
Treatment Dummies no no yes
External Factors yes yes yes
R2 0.487 0.496 0.501
N 1512 1512 1512
Wald 280.830 782.542 842.551
Note: Analysis for active contribution rounds (4-10) only
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at group level)
eRisk = elicited risk aversion
eAIA = elicited advantageous inequality aversion
eDIA = elicited disadvantageous inequality aversion
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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operation (collecting 8 tokens more than the baseline), whereas the mechanism is not
effective (or needed) in high-risk groups, consistent with individual level analyses. In-
creasing levels of risk aversion and its dispersion among group members have significantly
opposite effects for low-risk treatments, while these factors maintain the sign of impact
but lack significance among high-risk groups. High risk in homogeneous treatments ap-
pears to be the preeminent factor that influences cooperation both at the individual and
group level. Although intrinsic preferences impact individual contributions, group vari-
ation among these parameters does not influence collective behavior as the fixation with
high-risk susceptibility remains the ultimate free riding deterrent. Among group inequal-
ity aversion (IA) measures, mean advantageous IA significantly increases contributions
in high-risk groups while mean disadvantageous IA imparts the same impact on low-risk
groups. The questionnaire (Figure 1.10) reveals high-risk groups agreed that rich play-
ers should be responsible for contributing a greater share of their endowment, thus the
significant positive influence of the mean guilt parameter. A similar effect is seen among
the low-risk treatment, however, incremental guilt does not significantly impact group
contributions when coupled with low stakes of economic loss.
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Figure 1.9: Group Contributions per Period
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Figure 1.10: Questionnaire Summary (Mean Responses)
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Among heterogeneous risk groups, nearly all group measures impact contributions. To
better interpret the significance of these group factors, it is constructive to consider their
effects relative to the pooled homogeneous treatment reported in the last column of Figure
1.9. Punishment incentivizes group contributions and adds almost 8 extra tokens in the
final collective fund. Increasing levels of mean guilt spur heterogenous group members
to contribute more when they are relatively better off than others, however, higher levels
of mean envy significantly decrease their contributions in response to many dimensions
of inequality. Noted in their relative magnitudes, heterogeneous group contributions are
almost five times more influenced by collective guilt (eAIA) than envy (eDIA), qualita-
tively similar to the individual analyses. With two levels of variety (risk and endowment)
in the heterogeneous risk groups, risk aversion no longer proxies as a measure of distrust
and higher levels of the group parameter increase contributions. While there were two
identically endowed pairs who all shared a common risk factor in homogeneous groups,
players in heterogeneous groups were unique in their initial risk/endowment profile and so
were not able to form a faux alliance with similarly assigned players, removing trust issues
reported in the questionnaire. With four unique players in heterogeneous groups, mean
risk aversion impacts contributions in the positive manner anticipated by theory. Among
the dispersion parameters, each has an oppositely signed impact on group contributions
compared to their influence among pooled homogeneous groups. Increasing disparity in
the group envy (eDIA) parameter is beneficial to contributions as group members do
not coordinate in pursuing the free riding option. Higher variation among risk aversion
decreases group contributions as preferences to avoid risk are no longer aligned.
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1.7 Conclusion
Integrating intrinsic preferences and external pressures in a public goods game, this
chapter aims to understand the individual and group motivation that stimulate coop-
erative behavior in a collective-risk social dilemma. Politicians and global think tanks
incorporate the influence of risk, uncertainty, and inequality when devising rational ex-
pectations and policy suggestions, however, social preferences have improved models of
individual and group behavior. While the environmental literature has identified the ex-
ternal factors that impact public good provision, it has failed to control for and test the
significance of behavioral preferences that both inhibit and induce cooperative norms.
My experiment bridges this gap by constructing a multi-period threshold public goods
game that assigns risk and endowment profiles, addresses aversion preferences, and in-
troduces a punishment mechanism to disentangle the internal and external factors that
influence cooperation.
Given the multiplicity of equilibria where group members collectively aim for thresh-
old attainment, theoretical predictions of cooperation and behavior are difficult, thereby
paving the way for an experiment. Consistent with prior empirical results, contributions
in early rounds were optimistically high for all treatments, but cooperation significantly
decreased over time in non-punishment groups. The evolution of cooperation was in line
with expectations, as homogeneous groups coordinate more than their heterogeneous
counterparts. Whereas high-risk groups stabilize near an efficient two token contribution
per player-round, low-risk groups systematically coordinate toward a lower contribu-
tion average that induces higher rates of threshold non-attainment. This result suggests
that without punishment, coordination issues may be overcome if perceived risk is high
enough. The consensual punishment mechanism increased the likelihood of threshold at-
61
Punishment, Inequality, and Heterogeneous Risk in Threshold Public Goods Games: Tackling the
Climate Change Social Dilemma Chapter 1
tainment for homogeneous low-risk and heterogeneous groups, but did not have a marked
impact on high-risk groups that already had an incentive to cooperate. While perceived
risk levels of economic loss are privately derived in the real world, punishment may serve
as the “great equalizer” by eliminating total contribution differences between homoge-
nous and heterogenous risk groups. Furthermore, punishment attenuated free riding in
early rounds which increased threshold attainment.
Within groups inequality significantly impacted group behavior and final outcomes.
Regardless of punishment possibilities, rich players contributed more than the two token
symmetric equilibrium and more on average than their poor-player counterparts during
active rounds. This result is consistent with participant expectations on social respon-
sibility. Seeking to correct the endowment inequality induced by predetermined play,
large early contributions by rich players signal cooperation and propel these groups to
successfully reach the target threshold. Rich players contribute more than poor players
during active rounds, but the endowment inequality gap is never eliminated even among
successful groups. As a critical barrier to cooperation, the inequality gap for equal bur-
den sharing was minimized after introducing the punishment mechanism, increasing the
likelihood of threshold attainment.
Beyond the external pressures of risk and inequality, the theoretical impacts of intrin-
sic preferences are mostly supported by the data. As a player’s relative wealth fluctuates
with every round, both advantageous and disadvantageous inequality aversion increase
individual contributions in a public goods game where players dynamically incur bouts of
guilt and envy. Supported by the follow-up questionnaire, the impact of guilt was 10-20
times more influential than envy as players were more concerned about being at a material
advantage than hurting the group account when relatively poor. Risk averse preferences
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negatively impacted players in a game with both strategic uncertainty and the threat
of economic ruin. Controlling for disparate responses between those unequally endowed,
however, risk aversion coupled with poor endowments negatively impacts contributions
while the conditional effect of risk aversion on rich agents is predictably positive without
significance. Risk aversion proxies for distrust among the poorly endowed, while it main-
tains its traditional role among the richly endowed who fear economic ruin with higher
risk factors. Group composition among collectively held intrinsic preferences further
impacted cooperation. Higher mean values of advantageous inequality aversion signifi-
cantly propelled group contributions among all treatments as higher levels of collective
guilt aversion induced cooperation. Mean risk aversion continued to have a negative im-
pact on contributions where strategic uncertainty and trust issues may have outweighed
the collective aversion to possible economic ruin.
Experimental insights may be extended beyond the environmental realm to general
areas of policy interest. Expected utility-maximizers often invest resources to protect
themselves from the threat of economic loss, reducing exposure to risk with insurance
policies and a diversification of loss-prevention tactics. National security and education
are prime examples of collective-risk dilemmas where cooperation is costly to the indi-
vidual and benefits may only be realized when a common target is reached. Whether the
nation seeks a sustainable flow of military recruits or parents sacrifice time and resources
to educate their children, a target level of costly cooperation must be achieved to supply
a public good or avoid a common bad. Incorporating external pressures and intrinsic
preferences in policy analysis may reveal behavioral motivations that can be exploited to
achieve efficient public good provision.
While this chapter contributes to the environmental and behavioral literature, a bet-
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ter characterization of the climate change game would allow for further insight and policy
recommendations. Gradual impacts from a lack of investment to curb a public bad, in
addition to discontinuous catastrophic events, should be modeled when investigating free
riding tendencies and cooperation-inducing institutions. Environmental thresholds are
also not known with certainty, which could further weaken collective action. Assign-
ing individuals to groups in the experiment ignores the potential barriers to institution
formation that could improve the understanding of international environmental agree-
ments. Improvements aside, this study has identified the external factors, internal aver-
sion profiles, and efficiency gains from a consensual punishment mechanism that influence
behavior and induce threshold attainment in a collective-risk social dilemma.
1.8 Appendix
(Game instruction screenshots continued on next page)
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Chapter 2
An Economic Analysis of Radical
Environmentalism and
Counterterrorism Policy
Abstract: The War on Terror has motivated military and legal efforts to prevent not
only transnational terrorist incidents, but domestic terrorism as well. Operating on
the fringes of the mainstream movement, the FBI identifies radical environmental direct
action (REDA) groups as the number one domestic terrorist threat with over $110 million
in damages between 1995 and 2005. While passive legislative interventions increase the
cost of illegal action and proactive policies thwart terrorism with preemptive strikes, the
efficacy of counterterrorism efforts has been questioned. Using quarterly data from 1980
to 2014, I analyze the effect of counterterrorism policy on REDA modes of attack and
the severity of illegal actions. Combining vector autoregression and intervention analysis
under a rational choice framework, I find that while legislative policies have decreased the
economic severity of attacks, incidents have more than doubled. Proactive interventions
reduce domestic terrorism, but by a smaller magnitude than the increase from passive
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legislation. Substituting between modes of attack and ideological targets, policies have
tripled the use of explosives while REDA attacks against people have increased more
than sixfold in the long run.
2.1 Introduction
Since the early 1970s, the modern environmental movement has fought to conserve
natural resources, protect wildlife, and mitigate the ill-effects of pollution on human
health. Whereas mainstream groups target public opinion and introduce legislation to
enact change, radical factions utilize illegal direct action to obstruct environmentally de-
structive practices. Activists tree-spike old growth forests in the Pacific Northwest to
deter loggers from harvesting trees and physically engage whaling ships in the Antarctic
to prevent the culling of whales for scientific research. Accruing over $110 million in
damages between 1995 and 2005, the FBI has labeled radical environmental direct action
(REDA) groups as the number one domestic terrorist threat (Inhofe, 2005).1
While passive legislative interventions increase the cost of illegal action and proactive
policies thwart terrorism with preemptive strikes, the efficacy of counterterrorism efforts
has been questioned. Studying U.S. aircraft hijackings from 1960-1976, Landes (1978)
found that regulations to improve pre-boarding screening increased the probability of ap-
prehension and decreased the number of skyjackings. Cauley and Im (1988) report that
embassy fortification does not significantly prevent diplomatic attacks and that only the
addition of metal detectors have had an impact in the long run. Enders and Sandler
(1993) found that the installation of metal detectors reduced skyjackings and diplomatic
1REDA incidents are comprised of radical actions from both environmental and animal rights ide-
ologies. Environmental advocates combat urban sprawl and point source pollution, while animal rights
groups tackle animal exploitation, experimentation, and use in the entertainment industry.
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incidents, but terrorists substituted toward hostage attacks and assassinations.
Relative to the extensive literature on transnational terrorism, few studies have
probed domestic terrorism. Beck (2007) studied the diffusion of radicalism in social move-
ments, sources of militancy, and the terrorist lifecycle. Webb (2010) explored geospatial
trends and new methods of attack among radical groups in the United States. As-
sessing the effective elements of counterterrorism policy, Deshpande and Ernst (2012)
qualitatively evaluated a federal operation to apprehend a radical environmental group
responsible for over $40 million in damages from 1996-2001. Carson (2010) found that
legal sanctions deter radical environmental incidents, but the direction of impact was
contradictory depending on the model employed. Prior studies have not investigated the
direct and indirect impact from multiple interventions on substitutable modes of terror-
ism and the increasing severity of illegal direct action.
Using quarterly data from 1980 to 2014, I analyze the effect of counterterrorism policy
on who attacks (ideology), where they attack (target type), how they attack (weapon
type), and the severity of illegal actions as measured by economic damage and target-
ing people versus property.2 A second objective is to distinguish immediate impacts
from long-run intervention effects after controlling for interrelationships between terror-
ism tactics. Given that governments allocate resources to thwart terrorism and activists
optimally choose modes of attack, a rational choice framework is employed to hypothesize
behavioral responses to counterterrorism policy and supply a set of testable predictions.
As substitution between targets, weapons, and ideologies of attack may bias a univari-
ate approach to modeling terrorism, I combine vector autoregression and intervention
2Prior studies have also included lawful protests in their analyses, but given that interventions are
meant to reduce illegal actions, I exclusively focus on these incident types.
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analysis to efficiently model interdependencies between multiple time series (Enders and
Sandler, 1993). Both passive and proactive interventions are included to identify their
disparate impact on the severity and magnitude of REDA attacks. Each of the four pas-
sive legislative policies (ADA, AEPA1, AEPA2, AETA; see Section 2.3) enacted since the
1980s have increased restitution and imprisonment penalties, while Operation Backfire
in 2004 infiltrated an activist network to prevent illegal direct action.
Evaluating the impact of counterterrorism interventions on REDA attacks, I find that
passive policies enacted to deter illegal activity have instead increased direct action in
the name of animal rights. As interventions increased the cost of animal rights attacks,
activists substituted resources toward relatively cheaper environmental direct action not
formally covered by animal enterprise legislation. Operation Backfire’s proactive ap-
proach significantly reduced illegal action across both ideological movements, albeit to
a lesser degree than the relative increase from passive policy interventions. AETA leg-
islation induced a significant long run increase in actions against private business and
the education sector, targeting university labs and researchers engaged in animal experi-
mentation and genetically engineered crop research. While minor sabotage remained the
attack mode of choice, passive policies almost tripled the use of explosive and incendiary
devices. Speaking to the severity of incidents, legislation that intensified penalties and
broadened the scope for conviction incentivized both animal and environmental rights
movements to substitute to low-damage attacks to minimize detection. Passive inter-
ventions increased attacks against people over sixfold in the long run as REDA activists
engaged in tertiary targeting to attack individuals affiliated with companies and univer-
sities that opposed their ideological agenda.
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2.2 Literature Review
Economic analysis on domestic and international terrorism has gained prominence
since the events of September 11, 2001 (hereafter 9/11). The FBI and US Department of
Defense define terrorism as “the premeditated use or threat of use of unlawful violence
to obtain a political, religious, or ideological objective through intimidation and coer-
cion of the larger population.” Schneider et al. (2009) contend that this definition has
its shortcomings, suggesting that an overreaching view of terrorism obscures from the
heterogeneity of terrorism, behavioral tendencies, and its impact on intended targets.34
General goals of terrorist activities include (i) gaining publicity and media attention, (ii)
damaging industry and national economies, (iii) governmental destabilization, and (iv)
the redistribution of power, influence, and wealth (Schneider et al., 2009). Tackling these
goals, terrorists are assumed to be rational actors who maximize expected utility while
considering incentives, costs, and the uncertainty of mission success.
Characterizing individual and national factors that induce terrorist activities, the
economic, political, and sociology literatures have developed several theories as to the
root causes of terrorism.5 Media outlets typically frame political instability and destitute
economic conditions as determinant factors that influence individuals to engage in illegal
activities. Controlling for the level of political freedom, however, Abadie (2005) reveals
an empirical regularity that risks of terrorism are not significantly higher in poorer coun-
tries (also see Kurrild-Klitgaard et al. (2006)). Surveying the Middle East over three
3While terrorism has traditionally been reserved for incidents involving the use or threat of use of
violence against a given population, the term’s applicability has broadened its scope in the past two
decades to include acts of violence toward inanimate objects with the intention of altering the owner’s
actions and practices.
4See Vanderheiden (2005) for a theoretical debate, framed around just war theory, on the conventional
limits and merits of adhering the stamp of terrorism to particular transgressions.
5This discussion draws partly on Schneider et al. (2009).
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decades, Piazza (2007) further contends that it is not poor economic conditions that
induce terrorism, but heightened levels of democracy that attract terrorism. Anecdotally
thought to combat the spread of terrorism, advanced education and higher incomes have
instead been correlated with its rapid proliferation. Empirical evidence suggests that
awareness in the deficiencies of politics and social equity incite the willingness of individ-
uals to participate in illegal activity (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003; Krueger, 2008).
Analogous to the hypothesized root causes that apply to the broad spectrum of ter-
rorism, “ecoterrorism” is not driven by governmental instability or dire economic cir-
cumstances, but rather from the reverse. REDA actions frequently occur in developed
countries with strong institutions that protect corporate enterprise and punish trans-
gressors. Although this chapter does not identify the root causes for REDA incidents,
counterterrorism efforts may have unintended consequences on activists who fight for
animal and environmental rights.
2.2.1 Economic Impacts of Terrorism
Identifying the economic consequences of terrorism, empirical efforts have endeavored
to measure its direct and indirect impact on economic agents. While terrorism directly
impacts the intended target (consumers, businesses, or the government) by destroying
human and physical capital, an interdependent economy causes social and economic
disruptions for non-targeted entities (Schneider et al., 2009). Literature on the direct
impact of terrorism has considered its effect on GDP, money markets, foreign invest-
ment, tourism, and loss of life (Enders and Sandler, 1991; Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004; Crain and Crain, 2006; Frey et al., 2007; Enders and
Olson, 2012). A stable supply of terrorist activity may also negatively impact industry
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operations by increasing credit and insurance risks (Schneider et al., 2009). Stock market
performance can further approximate economic damages from terrorism, as its variability
includes direct losses and expected future damages to company profits.6 While transna-
tional terrorism impacts have been widely approximated, the events of 9/11 generated
a substantial number of reports on its economic impact (Navarro and Spencer, 2001).
Accounting for over 3,000 lives lost from the attacks on the World Trade Centers and
Pentagon, estimates of the destruction range between US$ 25 and 60 billion. An outlier
in the terrorism impact literature, the economic costs of the 9/11 terrorist attacks are
orders of magnitude greater than other terrorist events.
Investigating the economic impact from radical environmental direct action, congres-
sional testimony revealed an excess of US$ 110 million in damages between 1995 and
2005 (Inhofe, 2005).7 A report by the Foundation for Biomedical Research (2006) con-
tends that attacks are increasing in both magnitude and severity, as violence has moved
beyond quantitative damages to the qualitative impact of driving researchers from their
professions and the societal costs of not finding cures to studied diseases. Terrorist at-
tacks in general have been found to become more violent over time (Enders and Sandler,
2000; Schneider et al., 2009). Evaluating the radicalization of domestic terrorism, Beck
(2007) finds that this phenomenon is not characteristic for ecoterrorist incidents in the
United States. Beck’s analysis, however, is constrained by its definition of radicalization
(whether or not a “spree” of attacks from imputed ecoterrorist cells escalated in tactics,
targets, and frequency) as well as the modeled time limit for groups to be identified as
6Insurance premiums may reflect costs from terrorist activity and the insurer’s assessment of repeated
attack probability. Assessing economic damages in private companies, however, is difficult with an
incentive to guard profit forecasts and insurance risk premiums. Disclosing attacks often incentivizes
additional terrorist activity and increases long-run aggregate damage.
7While a significant total, data limitations suggest an underestimation of damages. See Data for
further insight.
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radicalized. Further, these results may fail to detect long term changes in attack severity
by confining the analysis to a subset of historical REDA incidents (1998 to 2005). If the
economic impact of terrorism generally increases in severity overtime, or if there exists
substitution between targets and attack methods, counterterrorism policy may effectively
curtail illegal actions.
2.2.2 Impacts of Counterterrorism Interventions
Tipping the cost-benefit calculus of terrorist activity toward deterrence, the efficacy
of counterterrorism policies has been questioned. Counterterrorism efforts can be sepa-
rated into passive and proactive policies. Passive or defensive methods increase the cost
of an attack by making it more difficult to access targets with technology-based barri-
ers (e.g. metal detectors, reinforced infrastructure) or by instituting stricter laws and
penalties. Proactive policies utilize intelligence-led investigations to prevent terrorist acts
with group infiltration and preemptive strikes. Investigating the impact of improved pre-
boarding screening at airports, Landes (1978) found that metal detectors and increased
surveillance decreased the number of hijackings from 1960-1976. Cauley and Im (1988)
report that embassy fortification does not significantly prevent diplomatic attacks and
that only the addition of metal detectors have had an impact in the long run. Enders
and Sandler (1993) found that the installation of metal detectors reduced skyjackings
and diplomatic incidents, but terrorists substituted toward relatively cheaper hostage at-
tacks and assassinations. Studying the Spanish ETA separatist movement, Barros (2003)
found that military and police deterrence were generally ineffective in curbing terrorism,
while political influence from the regional Socialist party increased the number of assassi-
nations. Drakos and Giannakopoulos (2009) investigated transnational counterterrorism
methods, finding that the probability of thwarting a terrorist incident has increased over
82
An Economic Analysis of Radical Environmentalism and Counterterrorism Policy Chapter 2
time. The authors note, however, that the increased propensity in preventing terrorist
actions has had a greater impact on preventing property loss than reducing casualties.
Few quantitative studies have assessed the effectiveness of counterterrorism measures
on environmental terrorism (Liddick, 2006). Under a rational choice framework, Car-
son (2010) analyzes the impact of legal sanctions and morality on the illegal actions of
radical environmental and animal rights groups. Employing an interrupted time-series
model and a series hazard analysis, Carson found that passive legislation was influential,
but the direction of impact varied depending on the model used. Proactive methods
have also been analyzed in an effort to curb radical environmentalism. Deshpande and
Ernst (2012) qualitatively depict the efforts of an American inter-agency investigation,
Operation Backfire, that sought to cripple the actions of a radical group who were re-
sponsible for over US$ 40 million in damages in the Pacific Northwest (US) from 1996-
2001 (see Counterterrorism Interventions). Operation Backfire successfully infiltrated,
apprehended, and sentenced individuals in the network, preventing future illegal actions.
Preemptive tactics not only impact a targeted group, but may indirectly influence the
behavior of other movement factions.
2.3 Counterterrorism Interventions
Both passive and proactive policies are evaluated in this analysis. Passive policies in-
clude state and federal legislation enacted to increase the cost of illegal action. Proactive
policies thwart terrorism with preemptive strikes and group infiltration. The following
interventions were implemented at the federal level during the target period of study,
1980-2014.
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Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988
The Anti-Drug Abuse (ADA) Act of 1988 sought to prevent the manufacturing, dis-
tribution, and use of illegal drugs by strengthening federal drug control oversight and in-
creasing minimum penalties for drug traffickers and users.8 While the legislation intended
to fight the war on drugs and not curtail illegal environmental actions, congressional tes-
timony by Senator James McClure addressed a provision criminalizing dangerous booby
traps used on public lands that could harm humans (Smith, 2008). Citing a tree-spiking
incident that injured a logger, Senator McClure proposed broadening the Act’s over-
sight to include hazardous devices that could harm law enforcement and loggers alike.
The amended Act penalized transgressions meant to obstruct or harass the harvesting of
timber, imprisoning offenders between one and 20 years depending on the frequency and
magnitude of the incident. In an effort to minimize escalating direct action, the ADA Act
set a precedent to criminalize illegal activism in the name of animals and the environment.
Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992
In August 1992 Congress passed the Animal Enterprise Protection Act (hereafter,
AEPA1) that coined the crime of “animal enterprise terrorism” and criminalized the un-
lawful sabotage of commerce or academic research involving animals.9 The Act targeted
anyone who “intentionally causes physical disruption to the functioning of an animal
enterprise” and thereby causes economic damage to that enterprise. Sentences under
AEPA1 included fines, restitution, and possible imprisonment of not more than one year
for infractions not involving serious bodily injury. Explicitly defining targets and po-
8Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No. 100-690 (November 18, 1988).
9Animal Enterprise Protection Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 43, Public Law No. 102-346 (August 26,
1992).
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tential punishment, this legislation served to protect animal enterprises and increase the
cost of illegal direct action.
In June 2002 Congress amended AEPA1 to increase maximum penalties (hereafter,
AEPA2).10 Whereas convictions under AEPA1 required economic damage and property
loss in excess of $10,000, the modified act allowed for a broader spectrum of offenses.
Section 43(b) of title 18, United States Code, amended the penalties to include:
• Any person who causes economic damage not exceeding $10,000 shall be fined or
imprisoned not more than 6 months, or both.
• Any person who causes economic damage exceeding $10,000 shall be fined or im-
prisoned not more than 3 years, or both.
Relative to AEPA’s original wording, the newly amended act now outlined penalties
for small-scale illegal actions (< $10,000) and increased penalties threefold for large-scale
actions (> $10,000). Increasing the scope of offenses and the magnitude of punishment,
this amendment further increased the cost of illegal direct action.
Operation Backfire (2004-2006)
Confounded with a wave of illegal direct action in the Pacific Northwest, the FBI’s
Portland office consolidated seven independent investigations in 2004 and named it “Op-
eration Backfire.” The primary target of the proactive investigation was a group known
as “The Family,” who were responsible for more than US$ 40 million in property damage
between 1996-2001. On December 7, 2005, aided by other federal agencies and group
infiltration, the FBI arrested seven people in four different states in connection with a
1018 U.S.C. § 43 (a), (b), (c) (amended June 12, 2002).
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variety of environmental sabotage actions. Following a year of informant testimony and
plea deals, a total of seventeen people were sentenced to between 3 and 16 years in federal
prison. Engendering fear and distrust in fellow activists, Operation Backfire capitalized
on confidential informants and cooperation following arrest to disincentivize illegal di-
rect action amidst the threat of betrayal and imprisonment (Deshpande and Ernst, 2012).
Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act of 2006
As the animal rights movement escalated and evolved, animal industry groups clam-
ored for broader legislation citing a lack of convictions under AEPA. In November 2006
Congress passed the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (AETA) that increased penalties
and further protected animal enterprises.11 Continuing to criminalize illegal action di-
rectly against animal enterprises, AETA could now convict anyone who targeted “any
real or personal property of a person or entity having a connection to, relationship with,
or transactions with an animal enterprise.” AETA proponents included this clause to
protect against “tertiary targeting,” a new strategy that attacked not only a specific busi-
ness or organization, but anyone affiliated with animal enterprises. Expanding AEPA’s
scope further, AETA protected against “intentionally placing a person in reasonable fear
of death” by way of “threats, . . . , harassment, or intimidation.” Adding this language
intended to deter protests outside an individual’s home or place of business that increas-
ingly caused a climate of fear for those targeted.
In addition to broadening potential offenses, AETA also served to increase penalties
for those convicted under its guidelines. Section 43(b) of title 18, United States Code,
amended the penalties to include:
11Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 43, Public Law No. 109-374 (November 27, 2006).
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• Any person who causes economic damage not exceeding $10,000 and does not instill
reasonable fear of injury or death, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 1
year, or both.
• Any person who causes economic damage between $10,000 and $100,000 or instills
reasonable fear of injury or death, shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 5
years, or both.
• Any person who causes economic damage between $100,000 and $1,000,000, shall
be fined or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
• Any person who causes economic damage exceeding $1,000,000, shall be fined or
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Relative to AEPA2, AETA’s penalties significantly increase the potential punish-
ment for incidents that cause economic damage and those that instill reasonable fear in
targeted individuals. The maximum imprisonment for small-scale actions (< $10,000)
doubled and penalties for large-scale actions (> $10,000) increased between 67 and 567
percent depending on the magnitude of economic damage.
While AEPA acts and AETA have focused on animal rights criminal activity, illegal
direct action against environmental enterprises has also been tried under AETA. Further-
more, given that the animal and environmental movements fight for similar ideologies and
its activists have worked together on covert operations, legislation targeting one group
can have a tangible impact on the broader movement by increasing the costs of illegal
direct action.
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2.4 Theoretical Framework
Examining terrorism in a rational choice framework, a resource allocation problem
can be modeled to identify behavioral responses to counterterrorism interventions (En-
ders and Sandler, 1993; Barros, 2003). The standard approach allows the terrorist choice
set to span alternative modes of attack (e.g. bombs or threats) or targets of attack (e.g.
businesses or universities) in an effort to maximize their intended goal, such as political
instability or forcing an enterprise out of business (Enders and Sandler, 2004; Sandler,
2013). Having allocated time between terrorist and non-terrorist activities, assume an
agent optimizes between two attack modes to maximize utility subject to a budget con-
straint. If the two attack modes available to the agent are bombs (B) and threats (T ),
then the budget constraint can be written as pBB + pTT = M , where pB and pT are the
per-unit prices of their respective attack mode and M is the level of income allocated to
terrorist activities. Per-unit prices comprise both the value of time and the pecuniary
cost of resources utilized for an action. Assuming an interior solution and well-behaved
preferences, Point A in Figure 2.5 illustrates the utility maximization problem when se-
lecting the optimal consumption bundle of terrorist tactics. Reflected in the BT -plane,
a steep indifference curvature implies a low degree of substitutability between bombs
and threats which ensues if an agent believes one mode of attack is more effective than
another. Perfectly elastic or inelastic indifference curves are possible if agents strictly
prefer one tactic (e.g. suicide attack), resulting in a corner solution.
Increasing the cost of illegal activity, the impact of counterterrorism policy can be
identified in this model as rational agents respond to relative price changes and behav-
ioral preferences shift in an evolving terrorism campaign. Assume new legislation imposes
significant imprisonment penalties on actions that create a climate of fear from threats
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or intimidation, increasing pT , in an effort to deter tertiary targeting (see Section 2.3:
Counterterrorism Interventions). Increasing the costs of threat tactics, this intervention
would rotate the budget constraint inwards along the vertical axis in Figure 2.5. The
new optimal bundle will depend on how the consumption of each tactic responds to an
income change and whether they are substitutes or complements. For simplicity assume
bombing activities are normal goods and substitutes for threat tactics. Assessing the leg-
islation’s aggregate impact on T, it is important to isolate the income and substitution
effects. An increase in pT causes terrorists to substitute away from threats and towards
relatively cheaper bombing tactics. A Hicksian compensated demand curve reveals the
pure substitution effect (Figure 2.5, Point B).12 If threats are a normal good, the decrease
in purchasing power further decreases the consumption of threat tactics. With negative
income and substitution effects, T decreases relative to its pre-intervention level (Figure
2.5, Point C). It is equally likely, with a finite set of attack modes, that threats are an
inferior good as they may constitute the cheapest terrorist tactic to achieve the agent’s
objective. The decreased purchasing power from an increase in pT would thus impart a
positive income effect. If the magnitude of the negative substitution effect outweighs the
income effect, then there is still an aggregate decrease in T (see Figure 2.6). In the case
of major inferiority, however, the positive income effect could outweigh the substitution
effect and increase the consumption of threat tactics above its pre-intervention level.
Although governmental intervention may increase the costs of terrorism, behavioral
responses may result in unintended outcomes which can be tested in the rational choice
model. If there existed substitutable non-terrorist tactics that increased the success rate
of a terrorist objective, governmental policy could reduce the cost or remove constraints
on these legal forms of activism, thereby disincentivizing illegal methods. Coined benev-
12See Varian (2014) for the complete spectrum of price decomposition scenarios.
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olence policy in the literature, this approach aims to increase the opportunity cost of
terrorist methods by reducing the price of substitutable non-terrorist activities (Frey
and Luechinger, 2003; Anderton and Carter, 2005). Corresponding measures may in-
clude improving access to legitimate means of protest or arbitrated negotiations between
activists and target companies. Intended to appease the mainstream movement, benevo-
lence policy might instead incense radical fringes who discredit cooperation and denigrate
compromise. Lastly, laws criminalizing an attack mode or protecting a target may sub-
stantiate the efficacy of illegal forms of activism that prompt special interests groups to
lobby for increased constitutional protection. Such a realization may theoretically alter
terrorist preferences toward an escalated campaign against its enemies.
2.5 Methodology
A variety of statistical methods (time series, survival analysis, multinomial logistic
models) have been used to measure the effectiveness of counterterrorism interventions.
In addition to testing for direct policy impacts, a robust identification strategy should
control for (i) dynamic links between separate time series and (ii) substitution possi-
bilities (see Section 2.4). Measuring the impact of policy interventions with a classic
autoregressive method, consider the following model:
yt = α + βyt−1 + γpt + t, (2.1)
where yt is the number of bombing attacks in quarter t, pt is a dummy variable in-
dicating whether a policy intervention was in effect at time t, and t is a white noise
variable. Assuming |β| < 1 precludes system shocks from having a persistent, increas-
ingly large influence through time. The short-run impact of policy pt can be evaluated
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by the magnitude and significance of γ, while the long-run impact is calculated as the
difference between the post-intervention mean, (α+ γ)/(1− β), and its pre-intervention
level, (α)/(1− β).
Traditional univariate models may confirm a policy’s ability to decrease bombing
incidents, but terrorists may substitute between other modes of attack. Sims (1980) ad-
vocated a vector autoregressive (VAR) approach to estimate economic relationships and
capture interdependencies between multiple time series. Modeling endogenous variable
interactions, the VAR framework can identify indirect policy impacts through relation-
ships with variables that may or may not be directly influenced by counterterrorism
interventions. Returning to the example in Section 2.4, let y1,t and y2,t be the number
of bombing attacks and threat incidents, respectively, in quarter t. Analogous to the
framework in Enders and Sandler (1993), consider the vector autoregressive system:
y1,t = α1 + β11y1,t−1 + β12y2,t−1 + γ1pt + 1,t (2.2)
y2,t = α2 + β21y1,t−1 + β22y2,t−1 + γ2pt + 2,t (2.3)
where βij (i, j ∈ {1, 2}) represents the impact of variable j ’s first-order lag on the i -th
attack mode. Illustrating the direct and indirect impact of counterterrorism tactics, as-
sume policy p increases imprisonment penalties on threat and intimidation campaigns
to reduce threat incidents in Equation (2.3). Coefficients γ1 and γ2 capture the policy’s
direct impact on attack modes 1 and 2, respectively. While a policy targeting threat in-
cidents may not have a direct impact on a substitute attack mode (i.e., γ1 = 0), if β12 is
non-zero the policy will have an indirect impact on attack mode 1 through its impact on
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attack mode 2 (Enders and Sandler, 1993).13 Interactions between attack modes imply
that a policy may reduce one terrorist tactic directly, but positive gains can be nullified
(increased) through indirect effects on substitute (complementary) incident types. In-
tertemporal dynamics and substitution between modes, targets, and ideologies of attack
may bias an inefficient univariate approach to modeling terrorism. A simultaneous vector
analysis aims to model the interdependence between multiple time series.
Generalizing the analysis to include additional attack modes or targets, policy inter-
ventions, lags, and exogenous variables, a vector autoregressive framework is represented
by the equation:
yt = α +
L∑
l=1
Blyt−l + ΓPt + Λxt + t (2.4)
where yt is a vector of n incident types and their respective count in quarter t, α is an
n x 4 matrix containing a constant and three seasonal dummy variables, L indicates the
number of lags specified by the model, Pt is a vector of k dummy variables pk,t that de-
fine if policy k was in effect at time t, xt is a vector of exogenous political and economic
variables, and t is a vector of white noise innovations that may be correlated across
equations. Controlling for exogenous impacts in matrix Λ, each Bl coefficient matrix
(n x n) represents the within and between impact of incident type i ’s l -th order lag on
the VAR system. Direct policy impacts are contained in matrix Γ. Illustrated in the
two incident type VAR system above, even if γik = 0, non-zero off-diagonal elements in
matrix Bl mean that policy pk will have an indirect effect on incident type i through its
dynamic relationship with other incident types (Enders and Sandler, 1993).
13Without loss of generality, assume there are two attack modes (yi,t and yj,t) and interventions (pi,t
and pj,t) targeting specific attack modes. In the VAR system, if βij and/or βji (i 6=j) are non-zero
coefficients, then policy j will have an indirect impact on attack mode i through its lagged relationship
with attack mode j, and vice versa.
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Utilizing the VAR framework to study terrorism-thwarting interventions, the impact
coefficient matrices in Equation (2.4) are measured similar to the method outlined in En-
ders and Sandler (1995). An identical step-by-step approach is employed to identify the
impact of counterterrorism policy on who attacks (ideology), where they attack (target
type), how they attack (weapon type), and the severity of illegal actions as measured by
economic damage and targeting people versus property.
Step 1 : Stationarity in levels for each time series is evaluated by testing for a unit
root with an augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test.14 ADF regressions include a requisite
number of lags to avoid serial correlation in the residuals, determined by a Breusch-
Godfrey test. If a series contains a unit root, successive tests are employed to determine
the order of integration (d) and assign d differences to induce stationarity.
Step 2 : Lag length in Equation 2.4 is determined by pre-estimation information criteria,
namely AIC and SBIC measures. Containing identical regressors for each endogenous
equation in vector yt, Equation 2.4 is efficiently estimated with ordinary least squares
(Enders, 2015).15 A Lagrange-multiplier test is used to check for autocorrelation in the
residuals of the VAR.
Step 3 : To avoid over-parametrization in the VAR model, variance decomposition and
Granger-causality tests help identify relationships between incident types to restrict in-
significant parameters from the analysis. Using a vector moving-average (VMA) repre-
14Each endogenous and exogenous time series is visually inspected to determine if a drift and/or trend
component should be included in the augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
15To ensure reliable estimates and interpretable findings, the stability of the VAR system is analyzed
post-estimation to confirm that its characteristic roots (eigenvalues) lie outside (inside) the unit circle
(Lu¨tkepohl, 2005). VAR stability is a necessary condition to calculate the moving-average representation
of the VAR system, to be used in Step 3.
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sentation of Equation (2.4) that relates each incident type in yt as a function of current
and past values of all error terms, the variance decomposition breaks down the propor-
tion of forecasted movement of a sequence due to its own shocks or the shocks of other
variables.16 When two series are closely related, at least one will explain a significant
proportion of the forecast error variance in the other series.17
Further exploring relationships between time series, Granger-causality tests whether lags
of one variable are useful in forecasting another variable. Formally, a times series yj
does not Granger-cause series yi if and only if all lagged variables of yj are jointly in-
significant. Adopting exclusion criteria from prior studies, if i) incident type yj does
not explain at least 10 percent of the forecast error variance of incident type yi and
ii) yj does not Granger-cause yi at the 0.10 level of significance, then zero-restrictions
(β1ij = · · · = βLij = 0, i 6= j) are imposed in Equation 2.4.
Step 4 : With nonidentical regressors in Equation 2.4 after applying Step 3’s param-
eter restrictions, the parsimonious system is efficiently estimated using a constrained
vector autoregression (Enders, 2015). Estimated coefficient matrices yield intervention
direct impacts (Γ), within and between lagged relationships (B), and control for exoge-
nous effects (Λ). Indirect and long-run impacts are identified with impulse response and
cumulative dynamic-multiplier functions (Lu¨tkepohl, 2005).18
16With a possibility of short or long-term relationships, 8, 12, and 20-quarter forecasting horizons are
explored.
17To control for residual correlation across time series, a Choleski decomposition is used to orthog-
onalize innovations in the moving-average process. As the Choleski decomposition postulates a causal
relationship between variables, results may be sensitive to the strict ordering of variables in yt. The
standard procedure is to i) list the variables in increasing order of contemporaneous dependence on the
prior series and ii) reverse the variable ordering to test the sensitivity of the variance decomposition.
See Enders (2015) for details.
18Impulse response functions (IRFs) detect dynamic relationships by subjecting the VAR system
to a one-time exogenous shock to one variable. The endogenous adjustment across equations reveals
how innovation shocks impact future variable values and measures the persistent effect of these shocks
94
An Economic Analysis of Radical Environmentalism and Counterterrorism Policy Chapter 2
2.6 Data
The REDA (radical environmental direct action) database includes illegal incidents
perpetrated by the animal and environmental rights movements in the United States
from 1980 to 2014. Quarterly counts were compiled from many sources, including main-
stays from the terrorism literature: the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by
the University of Maryland (START, 2015), RAND’s incident collection (RAND, 2015),
and the FBI’s Terrorism in the United States reports. These datasets are developed
via publicly available media reports, electronic news archives, and existing databases.
While these sources encompass a wide array of domestic terrorist events, they system-
atically underreport criminal REDA incidents which are not always included in terrorist
chronologies. Maintaining consistency with published datasets, additional data was col-
lected and coded in accordance with inclusion criteria outlined in the GTD codebook
(START, 2015). Supplemental sources are reported in Figure 2.2. Collecting a total
of 3,444 incidents from all sources, 1,511 unique incidents were included in the REDA
database after purging data that (i) did not meet minimum criteria (time frame, defini-
tion of REDA action), (ii) lacked credible primary sources, or (iii) duplicated previously
collected events.19 The below figure depicts aggregate REDA incidents from 1980 until
2014.
(Lu¨tkepohl, 2005). Determining long-run policy impacts, the dynamic-multiplier function captures the
effect of a one-unit change in an exogenous variable on endogenous variables over time.
19Limitations in terrorism datasets are important to address as incidents often entail covert operations
by clandestine groups. In addition to the upward trend in terrorism reporting after the events of 9/11,
supplemental databases are often compiled by interest groups that represent industries directly impacted
by terrorist groups; such data may be challenged as non-objective. Other databases include self-reported
incidents by activists and their own networks. Actions may be over-reported to instill fear, coerce current
and future targets, and induce targeted industries to finance interest group research. Actions may be
underreported by activists to prevent targets from investing in costly security deterrents and by victims
to minimize copy-cat crimes, increased insurance premiums, and reduced business from industry partners
and customers. Surveying multiple sources allows for cross validation to obtain the richest data possible.
Each incident has been verified by an alternate news source or an online database (LexisNexis, Internet
Archive) to substantiate information provided.
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Figure 2.1: Quarterly REDA Incidents
Each REDA incident contains information on both the target and perpetrator to
analyze domestic terrorism. In addition to cataloging the date and location of each
incident, the REDA database includes the perpetrator group name, ideology, and weapon
type.20 Victim characteristics identify target type and the amount of economic damage
sustained.21 Other time series were manufactured from these primary variables (see Table
2.5). Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 2.1.
20Ideology identifies each incident as motivated by either the animal or environmental rights movement.
Weapon type categories include biological/chemical, explosives/incendiary devices, firearms/melee, mi-
nor sabotage, and other.
21Target type is divided into four categories: private business, private citizens, public sector, and edu-
cation. The economic damage variable is divided into six non-overlapping bins: $0, <$1,000, <$10,000,
<$100,000, <$1,000,000, and <$10,000,000.
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Figure 2.2: Supplemental Sources for REDA Database
Controlling for exogenous factors and opportunity costs, the REDA database also
includes period-specific economic and political factors. These variables include the un-
employment rate and the presidential political party. Dummy variables have also been
incorporated to control for seasonal effects. Lastly, I include a dummy variable to con-
trol for post-9/11 terrorism reporting. The events of 9/11 increased media coverage of
all incidents marginally tied to terrorism, potentially biasing data collection relative to
pre-9/11 efforts.22 Variable descriptions for passive counterterrorism legislation (ADA,
AEPA, AETA) and proactive interventions (Operation Backfire) can be found in Section
2.3.
22It is plausible that the events of 9/11 did in fact breed more terrorism, responsible for the fre-
quency increase in many data sets. Empirical reports have also identified that incidents may have been
underreported due to a lack of media coverage prior to 9/11 events.
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Table 2.1: Quarterly Descriptive Statistics for REDA Incident Variables (1980-2014)
Category Variable µ σ Min Max
Ideology Animal Rights 7.84 9.66 0 48
Environmental Rights 2.95 4.93 0 29
Target Type Private Business 8.10 9.51 0 46
Private Citizens 0.49 0.97 0 5
Public Sector 0.76 1.15 0 6
Education 1.44 3.47 0 21
Weapon Type Biological/Chemical 0.14 0.41 0 2
Explosive/Incendiary 2.08 2.67 0 13
Firearm/Melee 0.46 2.08 0 21
Minor Sabotage 7.11 8.18 0 37
Other 1.01 2.30 0 15
Economic Damagea $0 0.45 1.45 0 15
<$1,000 3.70 6.42 0 39
<$10,000 2.86 3.99 0 23
<$100,000 2.00 2.37 0 17
<$1,000,000 0.86 1.29 0 7
<$10,000,000 0.20 0.57 0 3
Property vs People Property 8.28 8.88 0 48
People 2.51 4.95 0 32
Exogenous Controls Unemployment Rate 6.45 1.63 3.9 10.67
Republican 0.57 0.50 0 1
a Economic Damage bins are non-overlapping.
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2.7 Empirical Results
Estimation results present the effects of passive and proactive interventions (see Sec-
tion 2.3) on REDA incidents and possible substitution between modes of attack. These
models identify the impact of counterterrorism policy on who attacks (ideology), where
they attack (target type), how they attack (weapon type), and the severity of illegal
actions as measured by economic damage and targeting people versus property. Each
model controls for unemployment, presidential political party, the 9/11 effect, and sea-
sonal dummy variables that will be excluded from the output.
2.7.1 Counterterrorism Impact on Ideology of Attack
Federal investigations have revealed overlapping membership in the animal and en-
vironmental rights movements. If legislation increases penalties for illegal action in one
movement, activists may reallocate their resources toward a relatively cheaper substitute
cause. Given this dynamic relationship, evaluating policy effects on aggregate REDA
data fails to control for substitution possibilities and the disparate effect on each move-
ment.
Measuring the impact of counterterrorism policy on animal and environmental illegal
actions, vector autoregression (VAR) captures the interrelationships between the ideolo-
gies. Following steps outlined in Section 2.5, each series was found to be stationary and
two lags best characterized the autoregressive system. Although the variance decom-
position did not identify any links between the series, the animal rights ideology was
found to Granger-cause the environmental rights ideology. This finding implies that an
intervention directly impacting the animal rights series would indirectly impact the level
of environmental incidents.
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Imposing restrictions from the variance decomposition and Granger-causality tests,
Table 2.2 presents the coefficient estimates from the constrained VAR system. Although
the animal enterprise acts (AEPA1, AEPA2, AETA) aimed to deter domestic terror-
ism, illegal activity in the name of animal rights significantly increased following legisla-
tive interventions. While each successive policy increased restitution and imprisonment
penalties, animal activists increased illegal actions between 6 and 12 incidents per quar-
ter. Consistent with a rational choice framework, increasing the cost of illegal animal
rights action caused some activists to substitute toward relatively cheaper environmental
direct action. Following each animal enterprise act, illegal environmental direct action
increased between 3 and 10 incidents per quarter. Counterbalancing passive legislation
with proactive network infiltration, Operation Backfire targeted environmental activists
in the Pacific Northwest and significantly reduced illegal environmental activity by over
4 incidents per quarter. This proactive intervention also decreased illegal animal rights
actions by almost 6 incidents per quarter. In aggregate, passive counterterrorism policies
have significantly incited a greater magnitude of illegal incidents relative to proactive
efforts to quell direct action.
Beyond immediate impacts, a cumulative dynamic-multiplier function identifies a pol-
icy’s impact on endogenous series over time to determine long-run effectiveness in the
autoregressive system. The bottom of Table 2.2 reports the long-run impact of each
intervention after three years. Among the three animal policies, only the 1992 act had a
significant long-run impact on ALF activity. Instead of reducing illegal actions, however,
it significantly increased animal rights attacks by double digits per quarter. A notable
result from the VAR method is that each legislative animal rights policy had a perma-
nent effect on environmental actions. Stemming from the relationship between animal
100
An Economic Analysis of Radical Environmentalism and Counterterrorism Policy Chapter 2
and environmental incidents, animal policies permanently caused activists to substitute
to environmental direct action and indirectly increased long-run illegal action between 7
and 23 incidents per quarter. The proactive Operation Backfire intervention only signifi-
cantly reduced environmental actions in the long run, consistent with the rational choice
hypothesis.
Table 2.2: Quarterly REDA Incidents by IDEOLOGY (Model 1)
Endogenous Series
Counterterrorism Animal Rights Enviro Rights
Interventions (ALF) (ELF)
Immediate Impacts
ADA -1.224 -0.280
(2.02) (1.04)
AEPA1 6.135∗∗ 3.413∗∗
(2.76) (1.39)
AEPA2 10.660∗∗ 10.611∗∗∗
(4.96) (2.48)
AETA 12.662∗∗ 9.106∗∗∗
(5.39) (2.66)
Backfire -5.740∗ -4.186∗∗
(3.24) (1.68)
Long-Run Impacts
ADA -1.901 -0.642
AEPA1 11.288‡ 7.698‡
AEPA2 15.829 23.871‡
AETA 19.638 20.740‡
Backfire -10.484 -9.471‡
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
‡ Denotes a significant long-run impact after 12 quarters.
ADA: Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1988)
AEPA1: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992)
AEPA2: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (2002)
AETA: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (2006)
Backfire: Operation Backfire (2004-2006)
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2.7.2 Counterterrorism Impact on Attack Mode
Among the various modes of attack including who, where, when, and how illegal
actions materialize, this section focuses on the targets of attack and weapon of choice
during REDA incidents.
Table 2.3 identifies intervention effects on targets of REDA actions, broken down
into private business, private citizens, the public sector, and education. The education
series includes incidents against teachers, researchers, and publicly funded scientific labs.
From vector decomposition and Granger-causality tests, there emerged a rich network
of interrelationships between the targets of attack. Important distinctions include all
targets Granger-causing private business attacks and private citizen incidents being tied
to education attacks. One lag best characterized the vector autoregressive system and
all series were stationary in levels.
The descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 reveal that activists have overwhelmingly al-
located resources in attacking the private sector, averaging 8 incidents per quarter from
1980 to 2014. These actions include attacks on car dealerships, fur shops, and the enter-
tainment industry among others. Mirroring intervention impacts on ideological attacks,
passive animal legislation significantly increased actions against private business between
6 and 15 incidents per quarter. Easily accessible relative to other targets, striking pri-
vate business may constitute a low-risk, high-reward allocation of resources compared to
attacking governmental buildings and individuals at home. With a peak of 21 quarterly
attacks, education was the other major target as activists attempt to disrupt animal
experimentation and genetically engineered crop research. The widely publicized AETA
legislation induced a strategic response to target highly visible labs and researchers,
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boosting incidents almost 400 percent above average levels. Each successive passive an-
imal policy also significantly increased actions against private citizens, targeting sports
utility vehicles and executives at their homes. Operation Backfire continued to deter
illegal REDA incidents, significantly decreasing actions against private business and the
public sector.
All highlighted immediate impacts maintained their significance in the long run.
Stemming from its interdependencies with other targets of attack, each intervention’s
effect on private business attacks more than doubled after three years. Two more changes
are worth noting. While not immediately significant at conventional levels, AEPA1 in-
duced a marginal increase in public sector attacks in the long run. In the education sector,
not only was there a marked rise in illegal actions after AETA, AEPA1 significantly in-
creased incidents against educators in the long run. Two instrumental counterterrorism
acts have not only failed to deter illegal REDA actions, but have substantially increased
the targeting of researchers and university laboratories.
Focusing on how incidents transpired, Table 2.4 reports the effects of counterterror-
ism policy on weapon type in REDA actions. All series were found to be stationary in
levels and one lag best characterized the system. Variance decomposition and Granger-
causality tests directly link explosives and minor sabotage, while minor sabotage also
impacted each series. Explosives and minor sabotage against property constituted over
85 percent of actions per average quarter, while deadlier weapons of attack against people
(biological, firearms) were far less common. Although animal and environmental rights
activists frequently utilize terror tactics, each’s movement’s press office publicly heralds
the fact that neither group has ever killed anyone.
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Table 2.3: Quarterly REDA Incidents by TARGET TYPE (Model 2)
Endogenous Series
Counterterrorism Private Private Public
Interventions Business Citizens Sector Education
Immediate Impacts
ADA -0.485 -0.021 -0.145 -0.514
(1.94) (0.26) (0.30) (0.84)
AEPA1 6.228∗∗ 0.999∗∗∗ 0.540 1.771
(2.67) (0.35) (0.42) (1.14)
AEPA2 15.508∗∗∗ 2.035∗∗∗ 1.389∗ 1.773
(4.78) (0.64) (0.75) (2.05)
AETA 11.441∗∗ 2.348∗∗∗ 0.342 5.561∗∗
(5.11) (0.67) (0.79) (2.21)
Backfire -6.913∗∗ 0.135 -1.477∗∗∗ -1.633
(3.19) (0.42) (0.49) (1.33)
Long-Run Impacts
ADA -1.750 -0.054 -0.178 -0.886
AEPA1 13.980‡ 1.254‡ 0.731‡ 4.394‡
AEPA2 30.451‡ 2.459‡ 1.750‡ 5.747
AETA 28.173‡ 2.672‡ 0.850 12.249‡
Backfire -15.253‡ -0.176 -1.634‡ -2.712
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
‡ Denotes a significant long-run impact after 12 quarters.
ADA: Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1988)
AEPA1: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992)
AEPA2: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (2002)
AETA: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (2006)
Backfire: Operation Backfire (2004-2006)
Increasing the cost of illegal action, animal legislation intensified activists’ weapon
use against property. While passive interventions significantly increased minor sabotage,
these policies almost tripled the use of explosive and incendiary devices. Given the poten-
tial to harm human life, this effect was an unintended consequence of legislative policy.
Disincentivizing illegal modes of activism, costly penalties create a positive income ef-
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fect on inferior goods that could outweigh negative substitution effects, increasing overall
use of tactically efficient weapon types including small bombs and minor sabotage. In-
tervention impacts were magnified in the long run given the compounding ties between
series. Operation Backfire decreased overall weapon use, but its magnitude paled in com-
parison to the aggregate increase from passive animal legislation. Interventions did not
significantly impact the use of deadlier weapons that target people.
Table 2.4: Quarterly REDA Incidents by WEAPON TYPE (Model 3)
Endogenous Series
Counterterrorism Biological/ Explosives/ Firearms/ Minor
Interventions Chemical Incendiary Melee Sabotage Other
Immediate Impacts
ADA -0.037 0.400 0.018 -1.886 0.008
(0.12) (0.62) (0.64) (1.57) (0.62)
AEPA1 0.179 3.167∗∗∗ 0.453 5.338∗∗ 0.347
(0.17) (0.87) (0.88) (2.20) (0.88)
AEPA2 0.363 6.392∗∗∗ 0.494 12.014∗∗∗ 2.192
(0.30) (1.52) (1.57) (3.86) (1.53)
AETA 0.513 4.415∗∗∗ 0.808 15.881∗∗∗ 0.250
(0.32) (1.62) (1.70) (4.11) (1.63)
Backfire 0.006 -3.011∗∗∗ -0.034 -5.005∗ -1.921∗
(0.20) (1.02) (1.04) (2.59) (1.03)
Long-Run Impacts
ADA -0.047 0.284 -0.118 -2.852 -0.138
AEPA1 0.189 4.168‡ 0.986 12.491‡ 1.821‡
AEPA2 0.467 8.753‡ 1.646 28.104‡ 5.072‡
AETA 0.605‡ 6.719‡ 2.151 31.727‡ 3.387‡
Backfire -0.17 -4.033‡ -0.558 -12.602‡ -3.094‡
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
‡ Denotes a significant long-run impact after 12 quarters.
ADA: Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1988)
AEPA1: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992)
AEPA2: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (2002)
AETA: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (2006)
Backfire: Operation Backfire (2004-2006)
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2.7.3 Counterterrorism Impact on Severity of Attack
Intervention effectiveness can also be gauged by its impact on the severity of REDA
actions. A two-pronged approach is used to measure severity impacts, differentiating be-
tween the level of economic damage and the propensity to target people versus property.
Figure 2.3 identifies counterterrorism impacts on REDA incidents by damage amount,
broken down into six non-overlapping bins. Variance decomposition and Granger-causality
tests reveal a complex set of interrelationships between series that reduce as the bins in-
crease in magnitude. Information criteria identify one lag as best characterizing the
stationary system.
Descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 reveal a positively skewed distribution that favors
low-damage attacks. Incidents with less than $1,000 in damage are confined to minor
sabotage including spray painted property, broken windows, glued locks, and destroyed
fence enclosures. The animal rights movement made up most of the low-damage attacks
(92%), which constitute 44 percent of their total actions.23 Legislation targeting the
animal rights movement (AEPA1, AEPA2, AETA) failed to decrease low-damage actions
which instead increased between 113 and 300 percent relative to average levels. Surveying
higher damage bins, interventions continued to increase illegal activity but by a decreas-
ing magnitude. Targeting the environmental rights movement and infiltrating activist
networks, Operation Backfire significantly reduced all incidents with under $1 million
in damage. Constituting 68 percent of all environmental actions, Operation Backfire
particularly reduced incidents between $1,000 and $1 million in damage by incentivizing
23The remaining 8 percent of low-damage incidents were from the environmental rights movement,
which constitute 9 percent of their total actions.
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Figure 2.3: Quarterly REDA Incidents by DAMAGE AMOUNT (Model 4)
Immediate and Long-Run Counterterrorism Impacts
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smaller attacks to minimize detection.
In addition to impacting incident levels, REDA interventions also influenced each
ideology’s composition of damage attacks. Figure 2.4 breaks down the percentage of
incidents by damage amount before and after interventions. Before each intervention, an
average of 35 percent of animal actions were low-damage (< $1, 000) compared to only
7 percent for the environmental movement. The bulk of pre-intervention environmental
actions occurred in the $1,000-$1 million range, averaging 71 percent compared to 51 per-
cent for the animal rights movement. Highlighted table cells identify post-intervention
differences of at least 5 percentage points. Consistent with the rational choice frame-
work and prior results, Figure 2.4 shows animal legislation caused activists to not only
substitute toward low-damage animal incidents, but increasingly allocate resources to
mid-level damage actions in the environmental movement. Severe punishment penalties
also decreased the composition of large-scale actions (> $1 million) across interventions
and movements.
All immediate impacts in Figure 2.3 remain significant in the long run except Oper-
ation Backfire’s effect on low-damage attacks (< $1, 000). While this proactive interven-
tion targeted environmental groups, a large compositional shift in animal rights incidents
may have negated the overall reduction in low-damage illegal action. AETA caused the
largest absolute increase in long-run aggregate incidents alongside the highest restitution
and imprisonment penalties to date.
An alternate method to measure policy’s impact on the severity of REDA incidents
is to model its effect on the propensity of actions to target people versus property. Ta-
ble 2.5 presents intervention impacts on these two endogenous series. Each series was
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found to be stationary and one lag best characterized the vector autoregressive system.
Although the variance decomposition did not identify any links between the series, the
“target property” series was found to Granger-cause the “target people” series.
Descriptive statistics in Table 2.1 reveal an overall tendency to target property over
people, averaging 8.3 and 2.5 incidents per quarter, respectively. Targeting people in-
cludes terrorizing researchers, home visits to executives, and endangering loggers. Passive
animal legislation (AEPA1, AEPA2, and AETA) significantly increased actions against
property between 8 and 17 incidents per quarter, almost tripling incidents relative to
average quarterly counts. Only AEPA2 significantly increased actions against people.
Enacting strict legislation to protect individuals from “threats, . . . , harassment, or in-
timidation,” AETA prevented immediate increases in the targeting of people. Operation
Backfire ubiquitously decreased incidents in both series.
Beyond immediate effects, the bottom of Table 2.5 exhibits long-run impacts from
passive and proactive interventions. All animal legislation continues to have a significant
impact on property attacks in the long run, albeit increasing illegal actions as opposed to
deterring illegal actions. Negative substitution effects that decrease actions against prop-
erty may be eclipsed by positive income effects from the tactic’s inferior status relative to
targeting people, leading to an overall increase in incidents. The model’s striking result is
the significant increase in actions against people following all passive animal legislation.
At the height of their influence, these interventions increased people incidents over sixfold
in the long run. Protecting against “tertiary targeting” that attacks those affiliated with
particular companies, AETA incentivized activists to bundle property damage with at-
tacking individuals. Operation Backfire significantly reduced long-run incidents in both
series, but by a smaller magnitude than passive legislation counterparts.
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Figure 2.4: Ideology’s Percentage of Incidents by DAMAGE AMOUNT
2.8 Conclusion
As governments allocate resources to thwart terrorism and terrorists weigh costs and
benefits in their optimal choice of attack, this study modeled the quarterly impact of
passive and proactive interventions on deterring radical environmental direct action. Pas-
sive legislative policies increase restitution and imprisonment penalties, while proactive
operations infiltrate terrorist networks to prevent terrorist activity. Combining vector
autoregression with intervention analysis, this methodology identifies the substitutable
nature of terrorism tactics and models the interrelationships between series to measure
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Table 2.5: Quarterly REDA Incidents: TARGETING PROPERTY vs PEOPLE
(Model 5)
Endogenous Series
Counterterrorism Target Target
Interventions Property People
Immediate Impacts
ADA -1.116 -0.178
(1.95) (1.18)
AEPA1 8.710∗∗∗ 1.040
(2.73) (1.65)
AEPA2 17.393∗∗∗ 5.084∗
(4.73) (2.91)
AETA 17.455∗∗∗ 4.849
(5.09) (3.11)
Backfire -6.613∗∗ -4.364∗∗
(3.14) (1.93)
Long-Run Impacts
ADA -2.130 -0.632
AEPA1 15.160‡ 4.179‡
AEPA2 29.715‡ 12.724‡
AETA 30.370‡ 12.479‡
Backfire -11.740‡ -8.519‡
Note: Standard errors in parentheses
∗p < 0.1, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
‡ Denotes a significant long-run impact after 12 quarters.
ADA: Anti-Drug Abuse Act (1988)
AEPA1: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (1992)
AEPA2: Animal Enterprise Protection Act (2002)
AETA: Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act (2006)
Backfire: Operation Backfire (2004-2006)
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both direct and indirect effects of counterterrorism policy. Previous studies have qualita-
tively evaluated the effect of government intervention on domestic terrorism or calculated
policy impacts without modeling interaction among terrorism series.
I find that passive policies enacted to prevent illegal activity have instead increased
incidents across animal rights and environmental movements. Activists respond to incen-
tives and increasingly substitute resources toward relatively cheaper environmental direct
action that is not formally covered by animal enterprise legislation. Proactive federal op-
erations reduce illegal actions, but these gains pale in comparison to unintended spikes
in attack after passive interventions. Criminalizing a broader spectrum of attack types,
passive policies have also incentivized activists to substitute toward low-scale actions to
avoid detection and elevated prison sentences. With increased lobbying to protect in-
dustry and research interests, each successive legislative act may impart the belief that
illegal actions have been successful at intimidating and causing economic harm to tar-
geted entities, thereby escalating the number of incidents over time.
While the economic severity of each attack has steadily decreased, activists tripled the
use of deadly explosives and incendiary devices after passive legislation. Incidents against
people have increased over sixfold in the long run after primarily attacking property in
the past. These actions target not only researchers engaged in animal experimentation
and GMO testing, but individuals affiliated with companies and universities that oppose
their ideological agenda.
Although single-issue terrorism has declined in the last decade, violent actions are
cyclical and the government continues to bolster counterterrorism efforts. Unintended
consequences of government intervention should give policymakers pause before future
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legislative changes. Supported by the rational choice framework, passive policies have
incentivized activists to increase illegal actions and substitute toward violent forms of
attack. After forty years of mainstream campaigns and marginal direct action impacts,
activists have intensified attacks against individuals and tertiary businesses to dissuade
animal use and environmental exploitation. Complementing policies that increase costs
for illegal actions, interventions should account for the substitutable nature of terrorism
tactics and incentivize lawful forms of protest to prevent illegal activism.
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2.9 Appendix
Figure 2.5: Attack mode substitution (Threats: normal goods)
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Figure 2.6: Attack mode substitution (Threats: inferior goods)
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Chapter 3
Payments for Ecosystem Services
and the Impact on Avoided
Deforestation: A Meta-Analysis
Abstract: Payments for ecosystem services (PES) have complemented conservation ef-
forts to avoid deforestation in developing nations. Alongside protected areas and sustain-
able forest management regulations, PES programs provide a market-based mechanism to
compensate landowners and farmers for the environmental benefits they provide. While
deforestation rates worldwide have stabilized, the impact and cost-effectiveness of PES
programs have been questioned. Targeting counterfactual-based studies to identify addi-
tionality gains and minimize leakage impacts, I perform a meta-analysis to evaluate how
PES program design and market factors impact avoided deforestation. Program design
variables include contract length, payment differentiation, and participation targeting.
Environmental variables proxy for opportunity costs by controlling for alternative land
use prices and socioeconomic conditions. As each dimension has a varying impact on
avoided deforestation, these results aim to influence future market-based interventions.
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3.1 Introduction
Deforestation in developing nations contributes to soil erosion, flooding, and biodi-
versity loss, accounting for almost a fifth of net anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions.
Landowners increasingly clear private and public forests for soy and palm oil production,
cattle ranching, logging, and road construction to spur economic development (IPCC,
2015). In an effort to conserve natural resources, payments for ecosystem services (PES)
create a market-based mechanism to align private and social interests, compensating
landowners and farmers for the environmental services they provide. As opposed to
costly regulatory enforcement, PES is a voluntary agreement where payments are made
from beneficiaries to individuals conditional on adequate ecosystem service provision (En-
gel et al., 2008). PES projects have expanded significantly under the United Nation’s
initiative for Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+),
targeting climate change mitigation, improved watershed services, and biodiversity con-
servation.
Complementing protected areas, forest management, and law enforcement measures,
the effectiveness of PES programs to avoid deforestation has been questioned in an effort
to identify optimal approaches to forest conservation (Pattanayak et al., 2010; Samii et al.,
2014; Bo¨rner et al., 2017). Beyond controlling for administrative difficulties, institutional
barriers, and concurrent alternative forest conservation policies, voluntary PES programs
suffer from potential adverse selection and leakage. Participants who would meet program
requirements in the absence of payments often self select into PES programs, reducing
program gains (i.e., additionality) and cost effectiveness. Negative spillovers can further
diminish program gains. Leakage (or “slippage”) occurs if deforestation is substituted
away from enrolled parcels toward alternative land plots that would have otherwise re-
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mained forested. Further leakage occurs when market prices increase for limited timber
products, inducing other landowners to deforest marginal land.
While the PES literature has tackled mechanism design, theoretical benefits, and
qualitative case studies, a growing number of impact evaluations employ counterfactual-
based designs to identify causal PES gains in avoided deforestation. Bo¨rner et al. (2017)
compare theoretical PES effects to empirical evidence and find that actual gains may
lag behind forecasted impacts because of contextual factors (political and socio-economic
conditions) and PES design (payment type, length, enforcement, etc). Samii et al. (2014)
systematically review the empirical literature, concluding that PES programs reduce de-
forestation rates, however gains may be modest and program designs inefficient while
providing little evidence of poverty alleviation for poor landowners.
Synthesizing the empirical findings in counterfactual-based PES studies, I perform a
meta-analysis to identify how PES program design and market factors promote avoided
deforestation in developing nations.1 This report contributes to the literature by in-
cluding a database of research through 2016, narrowing study inclusion to quantitative
counterfactual-based assessments, and collecting new socioeconomic and market variables
that may help explain the variation in PES program effectiveness.
3.2 Data
Surveying the literature for empirical studies on forest conservation and PES pro-
grams, articles in this meta-analysis are peer-reviewed articles and working papers sourced
from Google Scholar, Webs of Science, and the NBER catalogue following the guidelines
1I follow the guidelines of Stanley et al. (2013) to systematically collect, code, and analyze results for
this meta-analysis.
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of Stanley et al. (2013). Although theoretical and qualitative sources were consulted
for background research, this study specifically focused on the growing literature on
counterfactual-based impact evaluation. Table 3.1 reports the twelve articles, published
between 2007 and 2017, included in this study. While there is documented evidence that
exclusively including published literature may bias meta-analysis results, peer-reviewed
work may indicate a measure of quality necessary for the counterfactual-based studies
and techniques this chapter analyzes.
Studies in this meta-analysis vary in many ways including intervention design, tar-
geted country, scale, and importantly the econometric method used and outcome variable
measured. The bulk of intervention studies have been in Mexico and Costa Rica given
their historical forest conservation efforts. Only Jayachandran et al. (2016) look at a pro-
gram not located in North or Central America, evaluating the impact of cash payments
to forest-owning households in western Uganda. Jayachandran et al. (2016) is also the
first study to employ a randomized control design to measure PES impacts while pre-
vious studies have used matching estimators and difference-in-difference methods. The
database of twelve studies includes a total of 35 unique impact estimates, varying by
matching method, filtering, and caliper choice.
Figure 3.1 reports both program design and market factors that may impact the effec-
tiveness of PES programs. Although each study attempts to measure the same general
phenomenon, the outcome variables collected include change in deforestation rates or
forest cover over different periods of time. In an attempt to standardize results across
all studies, the dependent variable Effect in Figure 3.1 measures the annualized rate of
avoided deforestation relative to a counterfactual estimate (see Section 3.3 for details).
The estimated effect size varies between 0 and 3 percentage points, with an average annu-
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alized avoided deforestation rate of 0.95 percent. While average impact magnitudes are
relatively low, PES programs have difficulty controlling for participation selection bias,
leakage issues, and isolating effects alongside simultaneous forest conservation initiatives.
The many program design variables controlled for include: outcome variable measured
(Method), a regional variable detecting scale of project, and country location. Specific
to contracts signed between PES organizers and landowners, I also control for program
and contract length, payment differentiation relative to the ecosystem benefits of enrolled
forested land, and relative payments. Individual contracts for landowners last about four
years before renewal, while actual PES programs can last up to twelve years in an area.
Although absolute payments levels are important to incentivize participation, the relative
payment variable accounts for a payment’s magnitude relative to the per capita income
in the region. Representing between 0.4 and 4.7 percent of the average per capita income,
relative payments are generally low which may account for modest PES impacts. Addi-
tional variables control for PES intervention alongside concurrent conservation policies
and whether studies target participation based on individual or land-based ecosystem
characteristics.
In an effort to capture opportunity costs and market characteristics, this meta-
analysis controls for average soy, timber, and cattle prices. Obtained from the IMF’s
commodity report, monthly nominal data was aggregated into yearly averages and ad-
justed for inflation.2 Yearly inflation-adjusted averages were then averaged over program
period length for each study. Increasing market prices for non-forest land use alter-
natives may disincentivize PES participation and contract compliance. Market leakage
is also a concern if participants enroll agriculturally poor land areas while substitut-
2http://www.imf.org/external/np/res/commod/index.aspx
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ing non-conservation activities to alternate parcels. Controlling for agriculture’s average
share of GDP and annual deforestation present additional proxies for forest conservation
pressures.3 Ranging from a modest 3 percent to over a quarter of a nation’s annual
GDP, agricultural economies present a challenge to successful forest conservation efforts.
Plagued by high levels of historical land clearing and timber production, average defor-
estation rates are relatively low at about one percent per year. Lastly, unemployment
rates further control for opportunity costs for landowners and illegal deforesters.
3.3 Methodology
Synthesizing empirical findings in the area of forest conservation, I employ the tools of
meta-analysis to statistically evaluate the effectiveness of PES programs and its determi-
nants. As these studies explore the impact of a range of economic and political variables,
as well as distinct PES experimental designs, meta-analysis permits the identification of
a standardized common effect using regression techniques (Nelson and Kennedy, 2009;
Stanley et al., 2013; Stanley, 2013). Targeted forest conservation studies commonly
identify effects in terms of either a proportion of fully forested parcels that have been
deforested or by reporting deforested area sizes. To compare empirical results across the
twelve studies in this meta-analysis, I employ a metric developed by Puyravaud (2003)
and used by Samii et al. (2014) to standardize the annual rate of deforestation across
studies. Intervention effect sizes on average annual avoided deforestation and the associ-
ated standards errors are calculated as:
α = [ln(
FCT
FCT −∆)/(t2 − t1)] ∗ 100 (3.1)
3www.data.worldbank.org
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and
γ = se(α) = [(FCT −∆) ∗ (t2 − t1)] ∗ 100 (3.2)
where FCT is average forest coverage for treated parcels, ∆ is the estimated treatment
effect, and (t2 − t1) represents the program period length.4
Relative to counterfactual deforestation rates, most studies report an effect size be-
tween 0 and 3 percentage points which complements findings in the literature (Samii et
al. (2014) and Bo¨rner et al. (2017)). Breaking down the studies by targeted dependent
variable, those that measure deforestation rates produce standardized effect sizes that
range between 0 and 0.8 percentage points (µ = 0.20, σ = 0.22) while studies that focus
on forest cover changes yield effect sizes that range between 0.7 and 3 percentage points
(µ = 1.81, σ = 0.90). The small effect of forest conservation programs may be due to a
number of factors including simultaneous intervention programs, selection bias in regions
not immediately in threat of deforestation, and market leakage. Although standardized
annual effect sizes are low, ongoing research has investigated the cost-effectiveness of PES
programs and seeks to identify the biodiversity benefits, increased ecosystem services, and
heterogeneous impacts relative to the size of enrolled areas.
4When estimated treatment effects are reported as changes in deforestation rates as opposed to
changes in forest cover area, FCT in equations 3.1 and 3.2 is replaced with Pa = CaA , where Ca is actual
post-treatment forest cover, A is the sum and size of treated parcel areas, and CaA represents the average
actual post-treatment forest cover proportion in treated areas. If a study fails to report forest cover
data, values are imputed from other descriptive statistics and treatment parcel deforestation rates or
obtained from the authors.
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Table 3.1: Summary of PES studies in meta-analysis
Study (Year) NObs Outcome Variable Country Scale Method
Alix-Garcia et al. (2012) 3 Defor Rate Mexico National Matching
Arriagada et al. (2012) 4 Forest Cover Costa Rica Regional Matching & DiD
Baylis et al. (2012) 8 Defor Rate Mexico Regional Matching & DiD
Costedoat et al. (2015) 3 Forest Cover Mexico Regional Matching
Honey-Rose´s et al. (2011) 2 Forest Cover Mexico Regional Matching & DiD
Jayachandran et al. (2016) 2 Forest Cover Uganda Regional RCTs
Robalino et al. (2008) 2 Defor Rate Costa Rica National Matching
Robalino and Pfaff (2013) 4 Defor Rate Costa Rica National Matching
Robalino et al. (2015) 2 Defor Rate Costa Rica National Matching
Sa´nchez-Azofefia et al. (2007) 1 Defor Rate Costa Rica National Regression
Scullion et al. (2011) 2 Forest Cover Mexico Regional DiD
Sims and Alix-Garcia (2017) 2 Defor Rate Mexico National Matching
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Figure 3.1: Meta-analysis Variables
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3.4 Empirical Results
Estimation results in Table 3.2 present the impact of both PES program design and
market variables on the effectiveness of payments for ecosystem services to avoid defor-
estation. Model 1 exclusively looks at the impact of PES program design on avoided
deforestation. Increasing contract lengths and relative payments improve the ability of
PES programs to decrease deforestation. With a steep learning curve from contract agree-
ment to implementation for landowners, increasing both contract duration and payments
may allow participants time to learn best practices and develop relationships with the
surveyors to boost forest conservation. Increasingly lucrative payments relative to the
average annual per capita income unsurprisingly induces higher forest protection. Con-
taining multiple phases and participation cohorts, extending PES program length may
unfortunately attract non-optimal landowners who self-select into the program and fail
to generate additional avoided deforestation. Targeting participation based on individ-
ual parcel characteristics may combat this negative self-selection, increasing ecosystem
benefits alongside payment differentiation among landowners with environmentally valu-
able land holdings. Although simultaneous forest conservation measures may negate
one another, I find that existing policies and programs in and around the study area
have a positive impact on avoided deforestation. These positive spillovers may result
from successful landowner experiences and informational transfers. Contrary to previous
evidence, I find that a regional program focus reduces the measured impact as these
programs may not control for leakage effects.
Focusing on market forces and alternative land uses, Model 2 explores the role of
opportunity costs on successful avoided deforestation projects. As close substitutes to
payments for forest conservation, increases in the price of soy, timber, and cattle products
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decrease the amount of forest preserved. Primarily subsistence farmers, an increase in
potential income increases the likelihood of deforestation in the studied areas. Looking
at the magnitudes of these three drivers for deforestation reveals the relatively sizable
impact soy and cattle price fluctuations have on forest loss. Beyond commodity prices,
high unemployment rates also reduce avoided deforestation in PES programs. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that reduced labor force opportunities may spur illegal deforestation
and increased market leakage as citizens exploit local natural resources to supplement
their income during times of economic hardship. A higher level of average annual de-
forestation is found to increase the gains of avoided deforestation, possibly a result of
increased efforts for conservation during times of environmental hazard.
Model 3 incorporates both program design characteristics and market forces to eval-
uate their impact on avoided deforestation. Most explanatory variables were found to
be robust in their sign and significance of impact across model specifications. I find
that relative pay and differential pay that targets higher payments for increased levels
of ecosystem services (carbon storage, biodiversity, etc) exhibit a marked increase in
magnitude relative to Model 1. These findings are consistent with the literature and
reflect the growing propensity to increase payments in PES programs by making higher
payments contingent on land characteristics. Among the proxy variables for opportunity
costs, rising beef and timber costs continue to deflate avoided deforestation efforts, while
increasing soy prices non-significantly impact the estimated effect.
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Table 3.2: Meta-Regression Results, Depen Var: Effect
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b/se b/se b/se
Method 0.926∗∗∗ 0.926∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
Regional -0.133∗∗∗ -0.107
(0.04) (0.11)
Mexico 1.444∗∗∗ 1.562∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.03)
DifferentialPay 1.081∗∗∗ 3.090∗∗
(0.01) (1.23)
RelativePay 0.462∗∗∗ 1.337∗
(0.01) (0.69)
ProgramLength -0.547∗∗∗ -0.458∗
(0.01) (0.25)
Contract 0.456∗∗∗ 0.433∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.04)
ExistingPolicy 1.595∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.13)
Targeting 0.306∗∗∗ 0.624
(0.05) (2.90)
Soy -0.105∗∗∗ -0.004
(0.00) (0.02)
Timber -0.019∗∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.00)
Cattle -0.188∗∗∗ -0.148∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.02)
AgGDPShare 0.114∗ 0.106
(0.06) (0.20)
AnnualDefor 0.589∗∗∗ 0.623
(0.10) (0.79)
Unemployment -1.433∗∗∗ -2.391∗∗
(0.31) (1.17)
Year Dummy yes yes yes
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Standard errors, in parentheses, are clustered by study.
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3.5 Conclusion
As governments and international programs allocate funds to target poverty alle-
viation and forest conservation, this study has aimed to calculate the net impact of
payments for ecosystem service projects and its determinants. In an attempt to incen-
tivize ecosystem service production, field researchers must design payment programs to
be both cost-effective and impactful. Over the past decade, a growing body of literature
has incorporated counterfactual-based measures to evaluate PES programs beyond quali-
tative assessments and anecdotal evidence. Surveying these rigorous studies, this study’s
meta-analysis serves to test both program design features and economic variables that
characterize successful avoided deforestation projects.
I find that PES program design and exogenous market factors can significantly im-
pact the effectiveness of payment schemes to conserve forests. Targeting payments toward
landowners who provide higher ecosystem services improves the additionality of a project.
Payment differentiation enables the project to capture both quality from highly valuable
land reserves and quantity from cost-effective low-yield participants. Longer contracts
with higher relative payments further improve the ability of PES programs to decrease
deforestation by supplying both time to effectively integrate best practices and funds
to substitute for alternative land uses. PES project administrators may also be able
to magnify the positive impact of payment programs if offered alongside other forest
conservation efforts that produce information spillovers and trust in the targeted com-
munity. Along the market factors dimension, commodity prices from timber, soy, and
beef markets proxy for opportunity costs in PES programs. Robust across specification
strategies, increasing timber and cattle prices induce participants to renege on contrac-
tual agreements and market leakage to deflate any avoided deforestation gains. In lieu
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of controlling commodity market prices, field researchers may use results of this analysis
to construct state-contingent payment plans that increase payments when market forces
reduce PES participation and compliance. Increased unemployment may further strain
forest cover protection as natural resources are commonly overexploited to substitute for
lost wages.
Although estimated avoided deforestation impacts are small, in comparable contexts
these programs may be as or more cost-effective compared to alternative forest conserva-
tion efforts. Addressing controllable design features and exogenous market variables that
impact the effectiveness of PES programs can inform future projects and help identify
optimal strategies for forest conservation.
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